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IF NOBODY PICKS UP THE BALL, IS IT 
REALLY A FUMBLE, OR IS IT A FORFEIT?  THE 
NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION REQUEST FOR 
LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Bill was a successful college offensive lineman, was drafted in the 
second round of the NFL draft, and signed a lucrative contract laden 
with both salary and performance incentives payable upon completion 
of an initial five year term.1  Just two games into his third season, he 
suffered a serious head injury during a game that eventually ended his 
NFL career and caused him to suffer constant headaches and confusion.  
Bill’s doctors told him that his symptoms were directly related to his 
head injury.  Unable to hold gainful employment as a result of his injury, 
Bill applied to the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan for 
total disability benefits to help pay for his mounting medical and living 
expenses.  Despite the opinion of the plan doctor that Bill was totally and 
permanently disabled, the plan board voted to deny full benefits. 
Bill then sued the board in federal court to have the decision 
reviewed, but the court found that the board acted within its discretion 
in determining that Bill did not qualify for full benefits.  Later, a rift 
among the board members resulted in a public revelation that the three 
league-appointed members voted to deny Bill full benefits under 
pressure from team owners.  
The owners pressured these board members to consistently reduce 
the level of benefits paid to former players. The owners believed that if 
fewer benefit dollars were paid to former players, the currently active 
players would be less likely to seek higher benefit plan contribution 
levels from the owners when the collective bargaining agreement was 
renegotiated the following year.  The players’ union was furious, and 
called on Congress to remove the federal requirement that the league 
and union be equally represented on the plan board. 
Bill’s promise of a long NFL career and future financial stability had 
been dashed:  once by his injury, and a second time by the improper 
influence placed on the board by Bill’s former employers.  A system 
                                                 
1 The characters and stories presented here are purely fictional, and are offered for 
illustrative purposes.  However, the issues presented are not uncommon among disabled 
former NFL players.  See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing litigation brought by former NFL 
players who are now disabled, but have been denied disability benefits by the 
administrative board of the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Retirement Plan). 
Meyer: If Nobody Picks Up the Ball, Is It Really a Fumble, or Is It a Fo
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
1376 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
granting the players’ union more control with which to watch over the 
disability fund of its members might have helped Bill.  Yet, the risk of 
placing too much power in the hands of a union is a real threat to many 
Americans, such as those workers whose employers contribute to union-
run pension plans on behalf of employees. 
Wally had been a union employee at a local factory from the time of 
his high school graduation until his sixty-fifth birthday.  At sixty-five, he 
was diagnosed with a number of physical ailments that forced him to 
retire.  Wally’s employer had paid into a union-run pension fund for 
each of its employees for the past fifty years.  The same day Wally 
submitted the paperwork for retirement, news broke that the long-time 
union boss had secretly been making wasteful and fraudulent 
investments with the monies that Wally’s employer had paid into the 
retirement fund.  Unfortunately for Wally, Congress had long ago 
repealed protective legislation that would have forced the union to allow 
representatives of the employer to sit on the retirement fund’s 
administrative board.  Had this protection still been in place, the union 
boss’s actions would likely have been prevented before such a vast 
percentage of the retirement fund was wasted.  Unable to continue 
working and without retirement income, Wally was forced to sell his 
home and failed to sustain himself on social security alone. 
Although the scenarios described above are fictional, they reflect real 
concerns among America’s unionized workers.  There are many retired 
NFL players who suffer each day from total physical disablement, 
caused by serious football injuries rendering them unable to earn an 
income.2   
In addition to the physical pain, many of these proud and once 
powerful men must also suffer the pain of indigence and embarrassment 
because their disability plan does not provide them with the financial 
resources to obtain adequate care.3  The NFL Players Association 
(“NFLPA”) argues that federal labor law, specifically the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”), prevents the union from 
approving disability claims at the proper levels because it requires that 
unions (here, the NFLPA) and employers (here, the NFL and its member 
clubs) be equally represented on the disability plan board.4  The NFLPA 
                                                 
2 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing litigation brought by disabled former players against 
the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan). 
3 See generally NFLPA WHITE PAPER (on Retired Player Benefits System) (2007), 
http://www.nflpa.com/whitepaper/NFLPA_White_Paper.pdf. 
4 See STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR:  NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 
PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND 
TRANSPORTATION OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE NFL RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM 3 (2007), http://www.nflpa.com/whitepaper/Gene_Upshaw_Testimony_for_ 
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has asked Congress to remove this requirement of the LMRA entirely, 
without exploring any less sweeping alternatives.5  Congress has 
listened, but has been reluctant to effectuate this monumental change.6  
While the NFLPA, the NFL, and Congress each appear to see the 
problem as a fumble, to be recovered after careful consideration, the 
disabled and suffering retirees see nothing but forfeit in the headlines.7  
Clearly, an alternative solution that will help the NFLPA approve claims 
at the appropriate levels, while maintaining the protections intended by 
the joint administration requirement of the LMRA, is needed.8 
Part II of this Note discusses the economic origins of the LMRA, as 
well as the corruption-preventing structure of section 302 of the Act, 
which prohibits payments from employers to union bosses.9  Part II also 
discusses section 302’s stringent requirements for acceptable employer 
contributions to welfare benefit funds for union employees, including 
the joint administration provision currently at issue with the NFLPA.10  
Finally, Part II illustrates the structure of the NFL’s retirement and 
disability plan and discusses the most prominent legal actions brought 
by former players challenging the decisions of the plan’s board.11 
Part III evaluates the NFLPA’s request that Congress legislatively 
redact the joint administration provision of section 302.12  Part III also 
evaluates the NFLPA’s ability to effectively approve more valid 
                                                                                                             
Senate_Hearing_re_Disability.pdf.  Gene Upshaw passed away unexpectedly in August, 
2008, nearly one year following this testimony.  On March 15, 2009, the NFLPA elected 
forty-five-year-old Washington, D.C. attorney DeMaurice Smith as Upshaw’s replacement.  
Despite the long vacancy and transition in the Executive Director position, the NFLPA has 
given no indication that it intends to abandon the statement or requests made by Upshaw 
before the Senate. 
5 See STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW at 3–4. 
6 Michael O’Keefe, Congress Tells NFL to Fix Pension Disability Plan or Else, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, Sept. 19, 2007, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/football/2007/ 
09/19/2007-09-19_congress_tells_nfl_to_fix_pension_disabi.html. 
7 See generally Chuck Finder, NFL’s Disability Plan Puts Former Players Under Close 
Scrutiny, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, March 14, 2005, available at http://www.post-
gazette.com/pg/05073/471027-66.stm. 
8 See infra Part IV (discussing the need for a carefully tailored amendment to current 
labor law to help disabled players, and similarly situated retirees in other industries, 
receive the benefits they need). 
9 See infra Part II.A (discussing the post-WWII labor climate that gave rise to the passage 
of the LMRA). 
10 See infra Part II.B (discussing interpretations of section 302 by the Supreme Court and 
scholarly criticism of section 302’s joint administration requirement). 
11 See infra Part II.C (discussing the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan’s 
history and structure, and the challenges brought by disabled former players to the plan’s 
denials of disability claims). 
12 See infra Part III.A (discussing the impetus behind the NFLPA’s request that Congress 
redact section 302’s joint administration provision). 
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disability claims if the requested change is enacted.13  Finally, Part III 
evaluates both the potential negative and positive impacts on the 
organized labor community as a whole if the legislative redaction is 
passed.14 
Part IV presents an alternative to a complete legislative redaction of 
the joint administration provision of Section 302, proposing an 
amendment to the statute that allows for shifting administrative 
representation based on the presence of pre-negotiated employee 
compensation deferments.15 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Though the fierce battles waged on the fields of the National 
Football League each Sunday have long since ended for the league’s 
nearly 8,000 living retired players, the war for funds to care for the 
injuries sustained in those battles is being fought on a daily basis.16  The 
retirees claim that the NFLPA is failing in its duty to take care of its 
own.17  The NFLPA, on the other hand, argues that it cannot approve as 
many claims as it should because federal law does not allow the 
disability board to be fully controlled by the NFLPA.18  The federal law 
that the NFLPA claims prevents it from administering the disability plan 
appropriately is a specific provision in the LMRA that dictates who must 
sit on the disability administration board.19  Part II.A discusses the 
economic and social underpinnings that gave rise to the Wagner Act 
amendments, commonly known as the LMRA.20  Part II.B examines the 
relatively unchanged section 302 (dealing with payments to unions by 
employers and the administration of welfare funds) from the time of its 
passage in 1947 to today’s interpretations and criticisms.21  Finally, Part 
                                                 
13 See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the impact a legislative redaction of the joint 
administration provision would have on the NFLPA’s ability to approve a greater number 
of legitimate disability claims). 
14 See infra Parts III.B.2, III.B.3 (discussing the arguments both in favor of, and opposed 
to, a legislative redaction of the joint administration provision, through evaluation of the 
impact a redaction would have on the organized labor industries generally). 
15 See infra Part IV (discussing a proposed amendment to current law that is much more 
narrowly focused than the complete redaction of the joint administration provision 
proposed by the NFLPA). 
16 Les Carpenter, NFL’s Disability Plan is Taken to Task by Lawmakers,  SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, June 27, 2007, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/ 
2007/06/27/SPGI0QM7U21.DTL&hw=disability+plan+task&sn=001&sc=1000. 
17 O’Keefe, supra note 6. 
18 See  id. at 1; see also STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, supra note 4. 
19 29 U.S.C. § 141-197 (2000).  
20 See discussion infra Part II.A. 
21 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
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II.C details the evolution of disability benefits in the NFL and the 
NFLPA’s progress and current struggle to effectively and consistently 
assist its disabled retirees.22 
A. The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 
Arguably one of the most important pieces of labor legislation in the 
history of the United States, the LMRA, also called the Taft-Hartley Act 
after its sponsors, has been the source of both tremendous praise and 
harsh criticism.23  Part II.A.1 discusses both the political and labor 
climates in the United States in the years following World War II, which 
provided a basis for the development of the LMRA.24  Part II.A.2 
discusses the specific section of the LMRA that is at issue with the 
NFLPA, and the historical economic climate that gave rise to this 
section.25 
1. The Legislative and Labor Climate in 1947 
The economic impact of World War II and the continued economic 
growth following its conclusion created seats of power in many sectors 
of the American labor front, including positions of control in large labor 
unions.26  As the country’s manufacturing capacity grew to meet its 
needs, union officials gained significant control over both employers and 
the individual member-employees.27  Naturally, a spike in power often 
translates into the potential for misuse to the detriment of opposing 
considerations, and this is precisely what occurred in this context.28  In 
the period following the end of the war, numerous large-scale strikes 
spearheaded by ever-strengthening unions threatened to cripple 
                                                 
22 See discussion infra Part II.C. 
23 See discussion infra Part II.B.1 (discussing judicial interpretation and upholding of 
section 302 of the LMRA); Part II.B.2 (discussing the most prominent criticism of section 
302, both at the time of its passage and today).  
24 See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
25 See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
26 See Gerard D. Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEO. WASH L. 
REV. 285, 287–88 (1960–1961) (discussing the growing control placed in the hands of labor 
union leaders by the War Labor Board’s union security programs designed to alleviate 
tensions following the war-time no-strike pledges by the AFL and the CIO). 
27 See id. at 288.  See also HARRY A. MILLIS & EMILY CLARK BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER 
ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 273 (University of Chicago Press 1950). 
28 See Reilly, supra note 26, at 288 (discussing the penchant of the newly powerful unions 
to resort to the use of strikes on large scales instead of submitting to less invasive and 
drastic measures such as arbitration). 
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multiple vital industries, and in turn, the national economy.29  The 
growing state of unrest in industrial relations, coupled with a public 
perception that President Truman was unable to remedy the problem, 
led to a return of both houses of Congress to Republican control.30   Not 
surprisingly, the shift in control of Congress led to an effort to reform the 
current state of labor-management relations, with a virtual mountain of 
legislation proposed within one week of the start of the Eightieth 
Congress.31  Out of this body of proposals grew the bulk of the material 
that would culminate in the LMRA.32 
2. Impetus for Section 302:  The Prevention of Labor-Union Corruption 
Although the LMRA made sweeping changes to the landscape of 
labor-management relations in the tumultuous years following World 
War II, only a single section of the Act, section 302, is pertinent to the 
                                                 
29 See id.  Large scale strikes that stretched across major industries such as petroleum, 
coal, steel, automobiles, and shipping, threatened severe harm to the booming post-war 
economy.  Id.  The threat of economic shutdown was unacceptable to newly elected 
President Harry Truman.  Id.  Truman was so concerned about the potential for devastation 
to the economy from a railroad strike in 1945 that he sent an unsuccessful proposal to 
Congress that all individuals participating in this strike, which the President thought 
excessive, would be subject to conscription into the military.  Id.  A cursory glance at the 
labor climate in the immediate post-war years might have led to the conclusion that every 
industry was on-strike.  See MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 27, at 311–12.  The public 
perception of the organized labor front as a whole was founded in extreme caution, 
especially considering the significant impact work stoppages could have on the end-user if 
not resolved expediently.  Id. at 312.  Some of the more highly publicized strikes included 
the 113-day General Motors strike, the fifty-eight-day General Electric strike, and the 115-
day Westinghouse strike.  Id. at 312–13.  Although each of these strikes was eventually 
resolved, real progress was not made until President Truman, by Executive Order, allowed 
the National Wage Stabilization Board to approve wage increase demands that were 
consistent with a general pattern of wage increases that had been established in the specific 
industry or area.  Id. at 313.  Thus, the major sticking point seemed to be a prior reluctance 
by the board to approve of wage increases that had no trend-backed basis.  Id. 
30 See Reilly, supra note 26, at 289 (discussing that, although this was a significant shift in 
the political makeup of Congress for the first time in fifteen years, there was little 
indication that a labor reform bill as massive and far-reaching of the LMRA (passed as the 
Taft-Hartley Act) would come to fruition at all, much less within a one-year period). 
31 Id.  More than 200 bills dealing with some type of labor-relations reform were 
proposed during the first week of the Eightieth Congress’s initial session in January 1947.  
Id.  Although a majority of these bills did not conceive of the type of sweeping reform that 
ultimately came to be with the passage of the LMRA, the sheer number is still a significant 
indicator of the belief that the country’s labor structure was hanging precariously on the 
edge of a major collapse and would inevitably tumble over that edge absent some sort of 
reform.  See id.  See generally MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 27, at 363–64 (discussing the 
legislative climate and increasing sense of urgency in Congress to address the country’s 
pressing labor issues). 
32 Reilly, supra note 26, at 289. 
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NFLPA’s current problem.33  As such, a thorough discussion of the 
legislative history of the entire Act is beyond the scope of this Note.34 
Section 302 of the LMRA generally prohibits an employer from 
making payments, or delivering other things of value, to union heads or 
other employee representatives.35  Among the chief concerns of the 
authors of section 302 was the potential for abuse of the enormous power 
labor unions gained as membership swelled during the War and 
following its conclusion.36  More specifically, the general prohibition on 
payments to union representatives by employers was an effort to prevent 
extortion by union heads while threatening employers with frivolous 
work stoppages.37  In addition to concerns about extortion and bribery, 
                                                 
33 STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, supra note 4, at 3–4.  Testifying before the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Mr. Upshaw specified several of 
the NFLPA’s current problems that could be remedied by congressional action.  Id.  In 
addition to a reworking of the provisions of section 302 of the LMRA, Upshaw also asked 
Congress to enact some measure of federal oversight to standardize widely disparate state 
workers’ compensation laws and to remove the 2002 Department of Labor regulations 
requiring additional steps in the review of disability claims before the board.  Id. 
34 For a thorough discussion of the legislative history of the entire act, see generally 
MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 27, at 363–65. 
35 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) (2000).  Subsection (a) reads: 
(a) Payment or lending, etc., of money by employer or agent to 
employees, representatives, or labor organizations 
 It shall be unlawful for any employer or association of employers 
or any person who acts as a labor relations expert, adviser, or 
consultant to an employer or who acts in the interest of an employer to 
pay, lend, or deliver, or agree to pay, lend, or deliver, any money or 
other thing of value— 
 (1) to any representative of any of his employees who are 
employed in an industry affecting commerce; or 
 (2) to any labor organization, or any officer or employee thereof, 
which represents, seeks to represent, or would admit to membership, 
any of the employees of such employer who are employed in an 
industry affecting commerce; or 
 (3) to any employee or group or committee of employees of such 
employer employed in an industry affecting commerce in excess of 
their normal compensation for the purpose of causing such employee 
or group or committee directly or indirectly to influence any other 
employees in the exercise of the right to organize and bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing; or 
 (4) to any officer or employee of a labor organization engaged in 
an industry affecting commerce with intent to influence him in respect 
to any of his actions, decisions, or duties as a representative of 
employees or as such officer or employee of such labor organization. 
Id. 
36 See Stephen Fogdall, Comment, Exclusive Union Control of Pension Funds:  Taft-Hartley’s 
Ill-Considered Prohibition, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 215, 218 (2001–02). 
37 See id.  See also Note, Taft-Hartley Regulation of Employer Payments to Union 
Representatives:  Bribery, Extortion, and Welfare Funds Under Section 302, 67 YALE L. J. 732, 
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the other chief motivating factor for the enactment of section 302 was the 
prevention of abuse of funds paid by employers into union-operated 
pension and welfare funds.38  Observing the considerable influence labor 
unions had gained over employers and union members, Congress was 
concerned about the legitimacy of union-operated pension and welfare 
funds.39  Three primary concerns led to the enactment of section 302 with 
respect to welfare funds:  funds that did not benefit employees; funds 
used as union war chests; and collusive behavior between unions and 
employers.40 
                                                                                                             
733–36 (1958).  Seeing a failure on the part of the states to effectively prevent extortion of 
employers, and also bribery of union officials seeking to avoid the wrath of union-forced 
increases in wages, benefits, and other working condition improvements, Congress enacted 
the prohibitions of payments in section 302 as blanket prohibitions.  Note, supra, at 733–36.  
Congress intended to curb the problem by preventing all payments, but before the ink 
dried on the page came the realization that this type of blanket prohibition would decimate 
the structure of honestly operated union pension and welfare funds paid into by 
employers.  Fogdall, supra note 36, at 219.  See generally Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401 
(1977) (reiterating the general purposes for the Act as discussed in Arroyo v. United States); 
Arroyo v. United States, 359 U.S. 419 (1959) (discussing the various factors considered by 
Congress in legislating the LMRA and the stated purposes of the Act). 
38 93 CONG. REC. 4805 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1305 (1948) (remarks of Senator Byrd).  There was 
significant concern of abuse, resulting from the actions of John Lewis, head of the United 
Mine Workers, during a threatened strike in 1946 over the establishment of a pension fund.  
S. REP. NO. 80-105, at 54 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 458 (1948).  Lewis demanded that a pension and 
welfare fund be established for the miners by imposing a 7% royalty per ton of coal mined.  
Note, supra note 37, at 732 n.2.  When the miners went on strike and a deal was not reached 
after several weeks, President Truman had the mines seized under the War Labor Disputes 
Act, and subsequently authorized Julius A. Krug, Secretary of the Interior, to establish the 
fund that Lewis requested through a five-cent royalty per ton of coal mined.  Fogdall, supra 
note 36, at 222.  It was this drastic government action in response to an abusive and 
coercive union leader that Congress wanted to prevent.  See 93 CONG. REC. 4876 (1947), 
reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 
1947, at 1310–11 (1948). 
39 93 CONG REC. 4876 (1947), reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1310–11 (1948) (remarks of Senator Ball, the co-
sponsor of the Act). 
40 MATTHEW BENDER, 2-44 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 44.01 (2005).  First, Congress 
wanted to ensure that the funds were actually being used for the benefit of the employees 
on whose behalf the contributions were made.  93 CONG. REC. 4805 (1947), reprinted in 2 
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1304 
(1948) (remarks of Sen. Ball).  Second, Congress wanted to prevent the funds from being 
used by the unions as “war chest[s],” serving only the needs of union programs and not 
being subject to any legal rights of the individual employee.  93 CONG. REC. 4877 (1947), 
reprinted in 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 
1947, at 1312 (1948) (remarks of Sen. Taft).  In his statement, Senator Taft indicates that the 
funds contributed by employers typically come from a reduction in employee wages, and 
that to allow the funds to be controlled by the union exclusively, and used for union-wide 
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Despite recognizing the prevention of payments to union heads as 
an effective way to curtail dangerous collusive behavior, Congress also 
understood the need to preserve the opportunity for employers to make 
certain contributions, including those made to legitimately operated 
welfare benefit funds.41  Although many representatives in Congress 
were concerned that the narrow exceptions for legitimate funds were 
necessary, some legislators believed that any restriction at all was 
excessive and could lead to a significant burden on the individual states 
to support retirees and disabled former workers.42  Despite the 
minority’s concerns, the LMRA, including section 302’s prohibitions and 
narrow exceptions, was passed into law when President Truman’s veto 
of the bill was overridden in June of 1947.43 
                                                                                                             
programs, would effectively negate all legal rights the employee might have had to receive 
the kinds of benefits for which the funds were originally intended.  Id.  Senator Taft does 
not appear to devalue completely the union-wide programs, but instead questions the 
dedication of the union heads to meeting the most pressing needs of its individual 
members.  Id.  Finally, Congress wanted to prevent collusive behavior between employers 
and unions, and deemed a stop on all payments to be an effective method for achieving this 
goal.  MATTHEW BENDER, 2-44 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 44.01 (2005).  See also Note, 
supra note 37, at 733. 
41 See MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 27, at 561–62.  Because Congress recognized that not 
all welfare benefit funds run by unions were operated corruptly, exceptions were included 
to allow employers to make contributions for the benefit of their employees, so long as 
certain conditions were met.  Id. at 562.  The conditions required by Congress included 
requirements that the payments be held in trust for the benefit of the individual employees, 
that there be a written agreement between the parties detailing the operation of the plan 
and providing each side equal representation in the administration of the fund, that there 
be written provisions for using neutral umpires in the event of a deadlock concerning 
administrative matters, and that funds paid specifically for pension or annuities be 
designated as such and deposited in a separate trust to be used exclusively for distribution 
to plan beneficiaries, and presumably not for any administrative or operation expenses.  See 
29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (2000). 
42 Compare S. REP. No.  80-105, at 52 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 458 (1948) (indicating the need to 
preserve the ability for employers to make contributions to welfare funds, but to ensure 
that the union does not strong-arm the funds into use for questionable purposes to the 
detriment of the individual employees), with H.R. MINORITY REPT. No. 80-245, at 79, 
reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 
1947, at 370 (1948) (indicating that restricting the contributions at all is too extreme of a 
measure, and will result in employer decisions not to contribute at all, thus creating a 
problem for the individual states when workers are no longer able to work but have no 
funds on which to live). 
43 See MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 27, at 392.  Among the many concerns of the minority 
senators opposed to section 302’s restrictions included the chief worry that the exceptions 
for welfare funds were not sufficient to entice employers to continue making contributions, 
or to start doing so.  See H.R. MINORITY REPT. No. 80-245, at 79.  The unavoidable result, 
according to the minority, would be a massive influx of requests to the states for assistance 
when workers reached retirement age and could no longer continue to work, but had no 
nest egg on which to live out their retirement years.  Id.  The states, it was suggested, 
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Section 302(c) of the Act lays out the various exceptions to the 
general proscription of payments to union representatives, including 
section 302(c)(5), which allows payments to trust funds so long as certain 
criteria are met.44  Section 302(c)(5) specifies several criteria that must be 
met in order for the payment to fit within the exception.  First, the funds 
                                                                                                             
would be unable to handle this crippling financial burden, and the state coffers would run 
dry because the state governments were not equipped to subsidize such a large percentage 
of the population’s living expenses.  Id.  There is also an interesting implication in the 
minority report that employer funded pension systems were the sole solution to the 
problem.  Id.  There seems to be a general assumption that, absent employer funding, 
employees will take no affirmative steps to save funds for the sole purpose of funding 
retirement.  Id. 
44 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) ( 2000).  Due to the prohibitive length of the nine exceptions codified 
in this section, only the exception pertaining to welfare benefit and pension funds will be 
duplicated here.  Section 302(c)(5) reads: 
The provisions of this section shall not be applicable . . .  
 . . .  
(5) with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund 
established by such representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of 
the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents (or 
of such employees, families, and dependents jointly with the 
employees of other employers making similar payments, and their 
families and dependents): Provided, That (A) such payments are held in 
trust for the purpose of paying, either from principal or income or 
both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for 
medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of 
employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from 
occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or 
unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness 
insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such 
payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the 
employer, and employees and employers are equally represented in the 
administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the 
representatives of the employers and the representatives of employees may 
agree upon and in the event the employer and employee groups deadlock on 
the administration of such fund and there are no neutral persons empowered 
to break such deadlock, such agreement provides that the two groups shall 
agree on an impartial umpire to decide such dispute, or in event of their 
failure to agree within a reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to 
decide such dispute shall, on petition of either group, be appointed by the 
district court of the United States for the district where the trust fund has its 
principal office, and shall also contain provisions for an annual audit of 
the trust fund, a statement of the results of which shall be available for 
inspection by interested persons at the principal office of the trust fund 
and at such other places as may be designated in such written 
agreement; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the 
purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to 
a separate trust which provides that the funds held therein cannot be 
used for any purpose other than paying such pensions or 
annuities[.] . . .  
Id. § 186(c)(5) ( 2000) (emphasis added). 
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must be held in trust and used for the sole and exclusive benefit of the 
employees (the NFL Players in the present scenario), or their families 
and dependents.45  Second, the details of the payment structure must be 
specified in a written agreement, and this is typically done in the 
documents creating the welfare plan itself.46  Third, the employers and 
the employees (typically union heads) must be equally represented in 
the administration of the fund, and the written agreement must provide 
for the use of an impartial umpire to break deadlocks between the 
parties.47  Finally, the written agreement must provide for an annual 
audit of the fund to ensure that the fund fiduciaries are discharging their 
obligations to manage the fund in good faith.48 
B. Understanding LMRA Section 302 
While the LMRA impacts nearly every facet of the union labor 
market, only section 302—a prohibition of payments by employers to 
union officials—is pertinent to this Note.49  Part II.B.1 discusses the 
challenges that have been brought to the constitutionality of section 
302.50  Part II.B.2 discusses the range of scholarly criticism of section 302 
in the years since it was passed.51 
1. Case Law and Interpretations of Section 302(c)(5) 
Although the exceptions set forth in section 302(c) have been 
expanded since its original enactment in 1947, the specific exception at 
issue for the NFLPA, subsection 302(c)(5), remains untouched from the 
original language as passed.52  As the legislative history of the welfare 
fund exception of 302(c)(5) indicates, the Supreme Court shared 
Congress’s concerns regarding both the power of union officials and 
employers, with respect to the abuse of these funds to the detriment of 





49 See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing the NFLPA’s need to comply with section 302 
in administering its disability plan). 
50 See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
51 See discussion infra Part II.B.2 (the scholarly criticisms range considerably, from 
arguments that the section should be altered slightly to better meet its goals, to arguments 
that section 302 should be eliminated entirely for failure to meet any of Congress’s 
objectives in passing it). 
52 Compare Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, 
with 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5). 
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individual employees.53  Although the Supreme Court has not ruled on 
the constitutionality of section 302, several lower federal courts have 
upheld the provision against a litany of constitutional attacks.54  The 
Supreme Court has, however, made several important determinations 
regarding the scope and specific meaning of 302(c)(5) that are pertinent 
to the specific problem the NFLPA has asked Congress to address.55 
In Allied Chemical & Akali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co.,56 the 
Supreme Court determined that the section 302(c)(5) requirement that 
the fund be for the “sole and exclusive benefit of the employees[]” 
applied to retirees.57  The Court held that retired workers were to be 
considered employees for the purpose of section 302(c)(5), and were 
entitled to the benefits that were negotiated while they were active 
employees.58  While the inclusion of retirees under the protections of 
section 302(c)(5) is relevant to this Note, even more relevant is the 
Supreme Court’s lengthy discussion in NLRB v. Amax Coal Co.,59 
                                                 
53 See discussion supra Part II.A.2 regarding the legislative history of the LMRA.  See 
generally David B. Sweet, Annotation, Supreme Court’s Construction and Application of the 
§ 302 of Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended (29 USCS § 186), concerning 
Restrictions on Financial Transactions, 124 L. Ed. 2d. 789, § 5 (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
consistency in recognizing the original intent of section 302 as indicated in the legislative 
histories from the Eightieth Congress). 
54 See generally United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299 (1956) (upholding the statute as not 
unconstitutionally vague, not violative of Congress’s interstate commerce powers, not 
violative of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ protections requiring both certainty of the 
offense charged and a clear standard for guilt, and not violative of the due process 
protections afforded by the Fifth Amendment); United States v. Carter, 311 F. 2d 934 (6th 
Cir. 1963), cert. denied Felice v. United States, 373 U.S. 915 (1963) (upholding the provision 
against a vagueness attack with regard to who would be considered an agent or 
representative of an employer for purposes of making payments to union officials); United 
States v. Lavery, 161 F. Supp. 283 (M.D. Pa. 1958) (upholding the section as not violative of 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments for vagueness, and not generally violative of Congress’s 
legislative powers); United States v. Connelly, 129 F. Supp 786 (D.C. Minn. 1955) 
(upholding the section as not placing prohibitively rigid restrictions on activities between 
labor representatives and employers as compared to other individuals in business 
relationships). 
55 See discussion infra part II.B.2 (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the 
requirements listed in the section 302(c)(5) exception for welfare benefit funds). 
56 404 U.S. 157 (1971). 
57 Id. at 170 n.10.  Allied Chemical generally focused on a question of who may be 
considered an employee for purposes of certain provisions of the National Labor Relations 
Act.  See generally id.  Although the court defined an employee several times throughout the 
opinion as someone who works for another for hire (thus excluding retirees), the court did 
include retirees in the section 302(c)(5) exception that is pertinent to this Note.  Id. 
58 Id. at 170. 
59 453 U.S. 322 (1981). 
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illustrating the nature of the fiduciary duties of trustees appointed by 
management and the unions.60 
In Amax Coal, the Supreme Court clarified whether a trustee’s 
fiduciary duty is strict with respect to a fund’s beneficiaries, holding that 
the fiduciary duties of the plan trustees trump any interest the 
appointing party might seek to have the trustee advance in the 
administration of the fund.61  The Amax Coal Court illustrated several 
                                                 
60 See generally id.  The NFLPA’s concerns are focused on a perception that the 
requirement that the players’ disability fund be equally administered prevents retired 
players who meet the criteria to receive disability benefits from receiving those funds based 
on a duty of the league-appointed trustees to assume, as fiduciary concerns, the position of 
the league with respect to the disbursement of funds.  See STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, 
supra note 4, at 3.  See also NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 8–10. 
61 Amax Coal, 453 U.S. at 331–32.  In Amax Coal, the plaintiff owned a group of coal mines 
that it joined with other companies as members of a national multi-employer bargaining 
group for the purpose of collective bargaining with the United Mine Workers of America, 
the employee union.  Id. at 325.  The members of the multi-employer unit each contributed, 
as required by the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), to the union’s national pension 
and welfare fund, a section 302(c)(5) compliant fund.  Id.  The United Mine Workers’ 
National fund complied with all of the requirements set forth in section 302(c)(5), with the 
administration of the fund falling to a board of trustees selected in equal numbers by the 
union and the multi-employer bargaining unit.  Id.  When Amax opened a new mine, it 
negotiated a separate CBA with the union for the workers of the new mine, and did not 
join the multiemployer bargaining unit with respect to the new mine.  Id. at 326.  Although 
the CBA negotiated between Amax and the employees of the new mine was separate from 
the national multiemployer CBA, the provisions were largely identical, including the 
negotiated contributions Amax would make to the union welfare trust fund for the benefit 
of the employees of the new mine.  Id.  Following a strike and failed negotiations for a new 
CBA, Amax filed an unfair labor practice claim against the union, alleging that the union 
illegally attempted to coerce Amax to continue contributions to the national welfare fund 
despite Amax’s offer to establish a separate fund for the benefit of the employees of the 
new mine.  Id. at 326–27.  Amax wanted to establish a separate fund for the employees of 
the new mine because it felt that, as a separately bargaining employer, continued 
contributions to the union’s national fund under the multiemployer CBA would unfairly 
prevent Amax from selecting a trustee for the funds benefitting the employees of the new 
mine.  Id. at 326.  Following a ruling by the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) that 
the union had acted legally in its bargaining, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit reversed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari, only to reverse again.  Id. 
at 327–28.  The NLRB decision that the union had acted legally in its demands that Amax 
contribute to the national fund for the benefit of the new mine’s employees rejected Amax’s 
argument that it would be unfair to force Amax to contribute for the benefit of those 
specific employees because it could not appoint a trustee to act as a fiduciary for those 
specific funds.  Id. at 327.  The NLRB determined that a trustee, despite being appointed by 
a certain party, owes an undivided fiduciary duty to the interest of the beneficiaries of the 
fund.  Id.  Thus, the NLRB concluded that although the trustee can consider the interest of 
the party that appointed him, he would breach his fiduciary duty if he placed that interest 
above the interest of the beneficiaries.  Id.  Based on this determination, Amax’s prior 
participation in the selection of the employer-appointed trustee was sufficient to ensure 
that a trustee of Amax’s choosing was in place to adequately consider Amax’s interests to 
the extent necessary.  Id.  In reversing the NLRB decision that the union acted legally in its 
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important points with respect to the fiduciary duty of plan trustees that 
reach the heart of the NFLPA’s concerns about the effects of joint 
administration of welfare benefit plans.62  First, the Court indicated that 
there is no evidence in the legislative history that Congress ever intended 
the management-appointed trustees of 302(c)(5) funds to act in the 
interest of management, or be influenced by management.63  In making 
this determination, the Court rejected the argument that Congress’s use 
of the word “representative” was intended to indicate a duality of 
fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries and an agency relationship to the 
management.64  Next, the Court indicated that the strict fiduciary 
standards implied in section 302(c)(5) were codified with respect to 
302(c)(5) plans with the passage of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).65  The Court held that ERISA, in 
                                                                                                             
bargaining, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that a fund 
trustee appointed by management had a dual duty to act as both a fiduciary for the 
employee-beneficiaries, and as an agent of the employer(s) that had appointed to trustee to 
the board.  Id. at 328.  The court indicated that the fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries was in 
no way diminished by the obligation to act as an agent for the appointing party, and that 
trustees are obligated to administer the funds so as to advance the interests of the 
appointing party to the extent that a breach of the fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries will 
not result.  Id. 
62 See discussion infra Part II.C.3 (discussing NFLPA concerns over management-
appointed trustees and their ability to effectively participate in the decision to disperse 
disability funds). 
63 Amax Coal, 453 U.S. at 331.  But cf. Associated Contractors of Essex Cty., Inc. v. 
Laborers Int’l Union of N. America, 559 F.2d 222, 228 (3d. Cir. 1977) (indicating that, 
“Insofar as it is consistent with their fiduciary obligations, employer trustees are expected 
to advance the interests of the employer while employee trustees are expected to further 
the concerns of the union in the ongoing collective bargaining process between them[]”).  
Although the Associated Contractors court is referring to the bargaining process concerning 
amendments to the plan, it is likely that this understanding of quasi-agency would extend 
to the administrative activities of plan fiduciaries outside of CBA negotiations.  See id. 
64 Amax Coal, 453 U.S. at 331 n.13.  The court indicated that the equal representation 
requirement does not prescribe an agency relationship to management on the part of the 
management-appointed trustee, but rather serves to prevent misuse of the funds by union 
officers.  Id.  Furthermore, the court explained that a trustee appointed by management 
only represents the management to the extent that he serves to prevent the union-
appointed trustees from abusing the funds contributed by the employer.  Id.  See also 
Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) (discussing the strict 
enforcement of the rule against a trustee dividing his loyalty); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS:  DUTY OF LOYALTY § 170(1) (1959). 
65 Amax Coal, 453 U.S. at 332.  “Whatever may have remained implicit in Congress’s 
view of the employee benefit trustee under the act became explicit when Congress passed 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974[.]”  Id.  In determining that ERISA 
was a formal codification of the implied common-law law duties of fiduciaries for Section 
302(c)(5) plans, the Court relied on three different sections of ERISA: 
Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA requires a trustee to “discharge his 
duties . . . solely in the interest of the participants and 
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conjunction with section 302(c)(5), makes clear that both union-
appointed and management-appointed trustees are not the bargaining 
parties with respect to the contract between the two sides.66  Thus, the 
duties of the trustees extend only to enforcement of the specific portions 
of the CBA concerned with the terms of the welfare or retirement fund, 
and not so far as to create an agency relationship whereby the interests of 
the appointing party are a factor in administration of the fund.67 
In addition to the Supreme Court’s clarification of the fiduciary 
obligations of management and union administrative appointees in 
Amax Coal, the 302(c)(5) requirement of equal employer/employee 
representation has been held to be an absolute standard for purposes of 
compliance with the Act.68  Even the slightest evidence indicating that a 
change in the administration of a plan has caused an imbalance of 
representational power requires the change to be carefully scrutinized 
for compliance and adherence to Congress’s intent.69  As such, any 
revelation of imbalance upon review will cause the plan to violate 
                                                                                                             
beneficiaries . . . .”  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).  Section 406(b)(2) declares 
that a trustee may not “act in any transaction involving the plan on 
behalf of a party (or represent a party) whose interests are adverse to 
the interests of the plan or the interests of its participants or 
beneficiaries.”  29 U.S.C. § 1106(b)(2).  Section 405(a) imposes on each 
trustee an affirmative duty to prevent every other trustee of the same 
fund from breaching fiduciary duties, including the duty to act solely 
on behalf of the beneficiaries.  29 U.S.C. § 1105(a). 
Id. at 332–33 (footnote omitted). 
66 Id. at 336. 
67 Id. at 336–37.  But cf. Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Demisay, 508 U.S. 581, 
591–92 (1993) (holding that the Amax Coal decision did not create a statutory authorization 
to enforce trust obligations of plan fiduciaries, but rather specified that section 302(c)(5) 
was merely a statement of trust obligations necessary to obtain an exemption).  Despite 
Local 144’s reigning-in of Amax Coal, Amax Coal remains valid precedent for two of its 
important determinations.  See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of California, Inc. v. Construction 
Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993).  First, Concrete Pipe affirms the Amax Coal 
determination regarding the antithetical correlation between the fiduciary duty of a 
management-appointed trustee and an agency relationship between management and the 
appointee.  Id. at 616.  Second, Concrete Pipe approves the Amax Coal holding that ERISA 
codified the 302(c)(5) fiduciary standards for trustees.  Id. 
68 See Associated Contractors, 559 F.2d at 227 (discussing changes in representation 
structures under 302(c)(5) exempt plans as requiring careful scrutiny). 
69 Id. The Associated Contractors Court indicated the importance of such careful scrutiny 
when it held as follows: 
The requirement that employers and employees be equally 
represented in the joint administration of trust funds is thus central to 
the Congressional scheme set forth in section 302.  Any amendment to 
a trust fund agreement which even slightly restructures the 
representation of employers and employees in the fund administration 
must be carefully scrutinized[] . . . .” 
Id. 
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302(c)(5) as being contrary to the “thoughtful safeguards Congress built 
into this social legislation.”70 
2. Criticism of Section 302 
Although Section 302(c)(5) has remained unaltered from its original 
form in the sixty years since its passage, scholarly criticism of the 
provision has been anything but scarce.71  The general section 302 
prohibition on payments and the narrow welfare fund exception have 
been characterized, inter alia, as restrictive of the bargaining process, 
under-inclusive, over-inclusive, superfluous, restrictive of legitimate 
activity, contradictory to federally encouraged practice, and generally 
vague.72  While none of these criticisms should be haphazardly rebuffed 
without consideration of their individual merit, the absence of an 
amendment to the original 302(c)(5) language is at least somewhat 
indicative of Congress’s perception that the provision continues to serve 
its intended purpose effectively.73 
Although a number of authors have proposed legislative changes to 
clarify and narrow the meaning behind section 302 and its exceptions, 
others have suggested a complete repeal of certain provisions, citing 
                                                 
70 Id. (explaining that when a court reviews a plan change for compliance with the equal 
representation requirement, the court must look beyond mere technical compliance and 
instead evaluate the plan’s scheme for “meaningful adherence to the Congressional 
command.”).  The Associated Contractors court, likely relying on the voluminous legislative 
history of section 302(c)(5), seems to indicate that Congress did not pass such restrictive 
legislation without concern for the possibility that it could hinder the financial well-being 
of beneficiaries of legitimate funds.  Id.  As such, the court perceives, through the available 
histories, that Congress inserted the restrictions calling for joint representation after 
carefully considering the potential negative ramifications for overly burdensome 
restriction.  Id. 
71 See generally Megan Wallace, An Injustice to Section 302:  The Full-Time Union 
Representative Compensated by the Employer, 8 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 277 (2006) 
(discussing the generally vague nature of section 302); Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. 
Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions, 96 MICH. L. 
REV. 1018 (1998); Fogdall, supra note 36 (discussing the restrictive, over-inclusive, under-
inclusive, and superfluous nature of section 302(c)); Note, supra note 37 (discussing section 
302 as restrictive of legitimate activity and contradictory to federally encouraged practice of 
creating welfare funds for employees). 
72 See Wallace, supra note 71, at 303–04 (discussing the generally vague nature of section 
302); Fogdall, supra note 36, at 223–34 (discussing the restrictive, over-inclusive, under-
inclusive, and superfluous nature of 302(c)); Note, supra note 37, at 737–38 (discussing 
section 302 as restrictive of legitimate activity and contradictory to federally encouraged 
practice of creating welfare funds for employees). 
73 Cf. Wallace, supra note 71, at 303 (discussing the conflicting judicial interpretations of 
another section 302(c) exception and suggesting indirectly that Congress’s inaction in 
amending section 302 in the face of fifty years of labor and union evolution indicates a 
belief that the statute is functioning as codified). 
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fatal, irreparable flaws.74  Perhaps the most basic criticism, for NFLPA 
purposes, is that the equal representation requirement of 302(c)(5) makes 
a flawed assumption that a union is ill-equipped morally, ethically, and 
tactically to administer a fund on its own.75  This criticism maintains that 
not only are union leaders better attuned to the needs of those they 
represent, but that their elected status creates a built-in accountability 
standard that would encourage proper administration and eliminate the 
need for a heavy-handed federal mandate on administrative structure.76  
The NFLPA’s argument will rely heavily on the criticism that 302(c)(5) is 
over-inclusive in its prohibitions, and also on the notion that the 
presumption of corruption on which the provision is based relies on 
assumptions grounded in irrational, baseless fear.77 
C. The Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan 
Notwithstanding the longevity of the original language of section 
302(c)(5), there has been criticism of the requirements for plans to meet 
the 302(c)(5) exception.78  The NFLPA recently joined the critics when 
then-Executive Director Gene Upshaw testified before the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on September 18, 
2007.79  While the NFLPA appears to surficially understand the necessity 
of protecting funds contributed by employers from abuse at the hands of 
                                                 
74 See Fogdall, supra note 36, at 234. 
75 Id. at 227 (discussing the over-inclusive nature of the section 302(c)(5) equal 
administration requirements). 
76 Id.  See also supra note 67 (discussing the Local 144 decision limiting the use of 
section 302 for abuse of fiduciary status actions).  But see Schwab & Thomas, supra note 71, 
at 1078 (discussing the ERISA codification of section 302(c)(5) fiduciary duties as incentive 
for employers to embrace the joint administration requirement and become more involved 
in the administration of union welfare benefit plans). 
77 See Fogdall, supra note 36, at 228.  Fodgall asserts that no empirical data exists to 
substantiate the presumption that union control of employer contributions is an automatic 
trigger for abuse.  Id.  Fogdall argues further that the absence of a test period or other track-
record of exclusive union management of employer contributions to funds makes proof of 
the tendency for abuse difficult, despite the well-publicized examples of Jimmy Hoffa-type 
union improprieties.  Id.; see also id. (discussing Jimmy Hoffa’s leadership of a Teamsters’ 
pension fund and his improper use of the funds to expand his own influence over business 
communities in major American cities, and to extort payments from the fund to his 
personal accounts under the guise of consulting fees). 
78 See discussion supra section II.B.2 (highlighting the criticisms of section 302(c)(5) in 
both the original legislative histories and modern evaluations). 
79 See generally STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, supra note 4.  Upshaw was joined at the 
hearings by NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell and several retired NFL players including 
Hall of Famers Mike Ditka, Gale Sayers, and several other former players.  See Michael 
McCann, NFL Retirement System Not as Bad, or Good, as Argued, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED 
(Sept 18, 2007), available at http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/writers/michael_ 
mccann/09/18/hearings/index.html. 
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union officials, it nonetheless criticizes 302(c)(5) as unnecessarily 
restrictive of all union welfare plans, regardless of the specific structure 
of negotiated contributions and the strict limits placed upon alterations 
to the agreement.80  In order to better formulate an analysis of the impact 
that an amendment to section 302(c)(5) would have on the NFLPA’s 
ability to better meet the needs of its disabled retirees, a thorough 
discussion of the NFL’s current disability plan is necessary.81  Part II.C.1 
discusses the structure of the NFL’s current disability plan, including the 
application and approval process involving the disability board of 
trustees.82  Part II.C.2 summarizes the most prominent challenges made 
to rulings of the full disability board, including recent appeals to the 
Federal Circuit Courts.83  Part II.C.3 discusses the lack of remedies for 
retired players whose claims have been denied by the board, eliciting the 
NFLPA’s request that Congress take legislative action.84 
1. Structure of the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan 
The NFLPA first collectively bargained for a retirement, disability, 
and benefit plan for former players when the union and NFL agreed to 
the Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan in 1962.85  The Bell Plan 
provided enhancements to the earlier, rather limited NFL plan.86  It was 
not until 1989, however, that a new plan was negotiated to further 
                                                 
80 See STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, supra note 4, at 3.  Upshaw indicated that the NFL 
CBA creates a unique situation in that the employer contributions to the NFLPA plan are 
fixed as part of player compensation, and the players themselves make the determination 
as to what portion of their compensation will be redirected to the plan.  Id. at 3.  Upshaw 
implied in his statement that the section 302(c)(5) restrictions would function better if 
considerations were made for situations in which employer contributions are fixed, as these 
situations lessen the potential for the employer-appointed plan fiduciaries to make an 
attempt to quell the need for further employer contributions through the unfair denial of 
benefits.  Id. 
81 See discussion infra Part III.  
82 See discussion infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player 
Retirement Plan and its structure). 
83 See discussion infra Part II.C.2 (discussing litigation against the Plan by former NFL 
players challenging denials and insufficient awards of disability benefits). 
84 See discussion infra Part II.C.3 (discussing the NFLPA’s requests for legislative change 
to the LMRA). 
85 McCann, supra note 79, at 3.  In 1959, the NFL did agree to a limited retirement plan 
for former players, but this plan was modest at best.  Id.  The 1959 plan included only 
players active at the time, leaving players who had already retired without access to 
retirement benefits.  See NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 5.  Additionally, despite the 
1962 negotiation of the collectively-bargained Bert Bell plan, the NFL and NFLPA did not 
include the pre-1959ers in a retirement benefits plan until a new collective bargaining 
agreement was negotiated in 1993.  Id. 
86 See McCann, supra note 79, at 3. 
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supplement the benefits available to retired players.87  The new plan, 
called the Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan, again provided 
significant enhancements in benefits for retired players.88  Finally, in 
1994, the Bell and Rozelle plans were merged to create a single 
retirement and disability plan.89 
The current version of the plan provides retirement, disability, and 
other benefits for all retired NFL players who have met certain vesting 
requirements.90  Specifically, the disability system offers former players, 
who meet the requisite standards, options for both total and permanent 
(“T&P”) and partial disability benefits, depending on the facts of each 
player’s case as to his ability to work.91  One feature unique to the 
Bell/Rozelle Plan is the absence of a requirement that the disability 
claimed be suffered during employment.92  Indeed, the cause of the 
disability has no effect on eligibility to receive benefits under the plan, 
but simply impacts the level of benefits for which the player is eligible.93 
T&P disability benefits are available for retired players who are 
completely unable to work, and are designed to serve as income-
                                                 
87 See id. (discussing the creation of the Pete Rozelle plan). 
88 See id. (discussing the creation of the Pete Rozelle plan). 
89 See id. 
90 NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 5.  The retirement portion of the plan provides 
for severance guidelines, pension, annuity, 401(k), and a Health Reimbursement Account 
for qualifying medical expenses.  See FACTS ABOUT THE NFLPA’S RETIRED PLAYER BENEFITS, 
available at http://www.nflpa.com/pdfs/NewsAndEvents/Facts_about_the_NFLPA’s_ 
Retired_Player_Benefits.pdf.  A player is vested in the plans if he has logged at least three 
“seasons” of time in the NFL.  NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 9.  A player is deemed 
to have earned a “season” for vesting purposes if he is paid for at least three games during 
that season.  Id.  It can be inferred from the NFLPA documentation and requirements for 
vesting that a player needs to participate in three games in order to earn a “season[.]”  See 
generally NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT, AMENDED 2006, http://www.nflpa. 
com/pdfs/Agents/CBA_Amended_2006.pdf. 
91 See NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 5.  The total and permanent (T&P) benefits 
are divided into four categories based on the nature of the injury causing the disability and 
the timeframe in which the disability effectively prevents the player from earning income, 
necessitating a claim to the system.  Id. at 8.  The partial disability benefits, also called “Line 
of Duty” benefits, are made available to players who are injured significantly while they 
are still active, with the payment amounts varying based on years of service, the reporting 
timeframe, and other factors.  Id. at 9–10. 
92 See id. at 5.  The NFLPA points out that its plan is quite unusual in that it harbors no 
requirement that a disability occur during a player’s active employment with a NFL team.  
Id.  On the contrary, a player can become disabled through a latent football related injury or 
a completely non-football related injury many years later, and he will still qualify for some 
level of disability benefits under the system.  Id.  If the disability is unrelated to football, the 
level of payable benefit will, in most cases, be lower.  See id.  See also discussion infra at Part 
II.C.I (illustrating the different levels of benefits the committee may dispense based on the 
application and findings). 
93 See NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 6. 
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replacement plans in the absence of an ability to work even a desk job.94  
There are four categories of T&P benefits available:  Active Football 
Benefits; Active Non-Football Benefits; Football Degenerative Benefits; 
and Inactive Non-Football Benefits.95  In the alternative to T&P benefits, 
                                                 
94 Id. at 7.  Although the T&P plan is designed for income replacement, it is incompatible 
with the NFLPA’s other income replacement plan—the standard pension available to all 
vested players.  Id. at 8.  The NFLPA will not allow a retired player who has already begun 
to receive his pension to apply for disability benefits, regardless of the severity or nature of 
the disability.  Id.  Because a retired player automatically begins to receive his pension at 
age 55 under the pension plan, he will be ineligible for any disability benefits claimed after 
that point.  Id.  A player is also entitled to file a claim for receipt of his pension prior to 
attaining age 55.  FACTS ABOUT THE NFLPA’S RETIRED PLAYER BENEFITS, supra note 90, at 1.  
If the player chooses this option, he effectively cuts off his opportunity to apply for future 
disability benefits because the plan does not allow for dual receipt of pension and disability 
benefits.  Id. 
95 NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 8.  Active Football disabilities are disabilities 
related to the player’s participation in the NFL.  Id.  Although awards for disabilities in this 
category are substantially higher than any of the other three categories, the criteria for 
qualification are steep, requiring a finding of total and permanent disability within the six 
months following the end of the player’s NFL career.  Id.  The payment for former players 
awarded Active Football benefits is not a product of years of service or any other vesting 
requirement.  Id.  A retired player is paid $224,000 per year under the plan upon a finding 
of total and permanent disability, and is eligible for this full payment after an appearance 
in only one game in the league.  Id.  This level of disability is similar to the pension and 
disability plans available to Major League Baseball (“MLB”) players under the MLB 
collective bargaining agreement.  See McCann, supra note 79, at 5.  McCann discusses the 
relative strength of the MLB plan as compared to the NFL plan by pointing out that, unlike 
the NFL, a former MLB player need not prove that his disability resulted from a baseball 
related injury to receive the highest benefit level.  Id.  McCann also indicates that what he 
terms baseball’s “Moonlight Graham provision” (in reference to a character from the movie 
Field of Dreams) is so lucrative that a player can spend as little as one day at the Major 
League level and be fully vested with respect to both the retirement and disability plans.  
Id.  The next level of benefit available, active non-football disabilities, also dispenses with 
the vesting requirement, but pays nearly $90,000 per year less in benefits than Active 
Football disabilities.  NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 8.  The predetermined annual 
benefit amount for a player awarded active non-football disability is $134,000, but could be 
adjusted higher based on the benefit credits a player has earned for time in the league.  Id.  
The third category, football degenerative disabilities, appears designed to address latent 
injuries that a player suffers while playing in the NFL, but that do not bring about total or 
permanent disability until later than six months after the player has retired from the NFL.  
Id.  Football degenerative benefits, although paying only $24,000 less per year than active 
non-football benefits, allow the retired player to file a claim if he becomes totally and 
permanently disabled within fifteen years following the end of his NFL career due to a 
football-related injury.  Id.  Football-degenerative disabilities pay at an annual rate of 
$110,000.  Id.  Unlike the first two categories of disability, the Football-degenerative 
category requires that a player be “vested” in order to be eligible for benefits.  Id. at 9.  The 
final category of benefits is inactive non-football related disability benefits.  Id. at 8.  Paying 
less than one-fifth of the allowable benefit amount for football-degenerative disabilities, 
inactive benefits allow a player to file for benefits at any time during his life if he is 
ineligible for one of the other three T&P categories.  Id. at 8–9.  The annual benefit amount 
for the inactive non-football related benefits is $18,000 per year (or $21,000 per year if the 
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retired players who are not found to be totally and permanently disabled 
may qualify for partial disablement Line of Duty benefits.96  Line of Duty 
benefits are available to players who suffer a “substantial disablement” 
within the guidelines established by the American Medical Association.97  
The major difference between Line of Duty benefits and T&P benefits lies 
in the length of time the benefit is available and the threshold the player 
must meet in order to qualify.98 
Similar to disability plans in many other industries, when a former 
player applies for benefits under the Bell/Rozelle Plan, he must 
complete a specified procedure before the claim will be considered.99  
Following application, the former player is sent to a plan neutral 
physician for an initial medical examination.100  A two-person 
                                                                                                             
application was filed on or after April 1, 2007).  Id. at 8.  The inactive non-football category 
is also subject to the same vesting provisions as the football-degenerative benefits category.  
Id. at 9. 
96 Id. 
97 Id.  According to the NFL, most injuries suffered by NFL players are orthopedic in 
nature, leading the NFLPA and the League to adopt the American Medical Association 
guidelines for measuring levels of impairment for orthopedic injuries.  Id.  Any player who 
meets one of the following guidelines will be eligible to receive Line of Duty benefits: 
A 38% or greater loss of use of the entire lower extremity; [a] 23% or 
greater loss of use of the entire upper extremity; [a]n impairment to the 
cervical or thoracic spine that results in a 25% or greater whole body 
impairment; [a]n impairment to the lumbar spine that results in a 20% 
or greater whole body impairment; or [a]ny combination of lower 
extremity, upper extremity, and spine impairments that results in a 
25% or greater whole body impairment. 
Id. at 9–10.  Additionally, “[u]p to three percentage points may be added to the impairment 
ratings of a player if he experiences excess pain.”  Id. at 10. 
98 See id. at 9.  See also NFL CBA, supra note 90, at 133 (explaining the benefit credit 
system and its use for partial disability determinations).  Actual payment amounts for an 
approved claim for Line of Duty benefits are calculated based on the player’s accrued 
benefit credits.  Id.  For each season in which a player has been paid for at least three 
games, that season will be a credited season for benefit credit purposes.  Id.  See also NFLPA 
WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 9.  Over the history of the NFLPA’s renegotiated Collective 
Bargaining Agreements with the NFL teams, the credit amount assigned for each earned 
benefit credit has increased.  See NFL CBA, supra note 90, at 133.  The amount awarded 
under the current CBA for each benefit credit earned is as follows: 
[Credited Season in Plan Year]  [Benefit Credit (per month)] 
Before 1982      $250 
1982 through 1992     $255 
1993 and 1994      $265 
1995 and 1996      $315 
1997        $365 
1998 and later seasons    $470 
NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 22. 
99 Id. at 10. 
100 Id.  The physician is considered to be plan neutral based on his/her joint appointment 
by the full Retirement board consisting of NFL and NFLPA appointed-members.  Id. 
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committee, comprised of one NFL- and one NFLPA-appointed member, 
reviews the results of the initial medical examination and other 
application materials, and then makes a determination as to whether 
benefits should be awarded.101  If the claim is denied, the player may 
appeal to the full retirement board for review.102  On appeal, the full 
board reviews all materials from the record of the application, and any 
other information available from the player or other sources.103  
Additionally, the full board gives no deference to the decision of the 
Initial Claims Committee, and instead conducts a “full and fair and 
totally independent review.”104  If a full board denies the player’s claim, 
the decision is considered final, and the player’s only remaining remedy 
is an appeal to the federal court system.105  The full retirement board of 
the Bell/Rozelle Plan, in compliance with section 302(c)(5) of the LMRA, 
is made up of six voting members.106  Each side, the NFLPA and the 
NFL, appoints three members to the board, which oversees not only the 
evaluation of claims, but also the general administration of the plan and 
fund, as well as fund investment decisions.107 
                                                 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 11.  A claim is considered denied if the Initial Claims Committee is unanimous in 
its denial, or if there is a deadlock between the two members.   Id. at 10.  A player also has 
the right to appeal an approval by the Initial Claims Committee that he feels does not 
adequately meet his needs.  Id. 
103 Id. at 11.  The full board will consider information not seen by the Initial Claims 
Committee.  Id.  On appeal the player is also sent to one or more plan neutral physicians 
(but not the same physician who conducted the initial medical examination) for additional 
medical examinations.  Id. 
104 Id.  The review conducted by the full board is similar to de novo judicial review, which 
is defined as “A court’s nondeferential review of an administrative decision, usu. through a 
review of the administrative record plus any additional evidence the parties present.”  
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 392 (3d. Pocket ed. 2006). 
105 NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 12.  The plan also provides provisions for 
resolving 3-3 deadlocks between the members of the full board.  Id.  In the event that the 
deadlock arises over a medical issue, the player may be sent to the plan’s top pre-approved 
neutral physician for a final examination to answer the specific questions troubling the 
board.  Id. at 11–12.  If this method is used to resolve the deadlock, the decision of the 
physician is binding upon the full board.  Id. at 12.  In the rare event that a final 
examination by the physician is not requested by either side, the deadlock between the 
members of the board may be resolved by binding arbitration.  Id. 
106 Id. at 11.  The six-member board is made up of three NFLPA-appointed and three 
NFL-appointed trustees, with the current board containing two team owners and a team 
president (the NFL appointees), and three former players who each have extensive 
experience working with the NFLPA (the NFLPA appointees).  Id. 
107 See id.  See also STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, supra note 4.  The NFLPA appointees on 
the current board include Tom Condon (an eleven year player, past President of the 
NFLPA, a current attorney and a top football agent with Creative Artists Agency); Jeff Van 
Note (who played for the Atlanta Falcons for eighteen years, and was also a President of 
the NFLPA during his playing career); and David Duerson (an eight year NFL player, 
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2. Litigation by Former Players 
Despite the best efforts by retirement and disability administrative 
boards to fulfill their fiduciary obligations, those seeking payments 
sometimes believe a denial of their claim was erroneous.108  In the NFL, 
as in many other industries, when a beneficiary believes a claim was 
denied erroneously, he may appeal to the federal court system for review 
of the board’s decision.109  According to the NFLPA, there have been 
twenty-five decisions issued by federal courts in response to retiree 
appeals of claim denials since the Bell and Rozelle plans were combined 
in 1994.110  Of these decisions, all but one has been resolved in favor of 
                                                                                                             
Harvard Business School graduate, and current businessman).  NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra 
note 3, at 11.  The NFL-appointed board members include William Bidwill (the owner of 
the Arizona Cardinals); Clark Hunt (the owner of the Kansas City Chiefs); and Dick Cass 
(the President of the Baltimore Ravens).  Id. 
108 See, e.g., Washington v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 504 F.3d 818 (9th. 
Cir. 2007) (challenging a denial of benefits and alleging breach of fiduciary duty when the 
board failed to disclose its criteria for evaluating benefit claims); Jani v. Bell, 209 F. App’x 
305 (4th Cir. 2006) (alleging that the board abused its discretion when it denied benefits 
absent the support of any substantial evidence); Johnson v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL 
Player Ret. Plan, 468 F.3d 1082 (8th Cir. 2006) (challenging a finding that the board abused 
its discretion when it relied on evidence that a former player was employed in finding that 
he was not totally and permanently disabled, based on MAP reports); Williams v. Bert 
Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 61 F. App’x 362 (9th Cir. 2003) (alleging the board 
erred when it relied on evidence that a player was capable of sedentary work to 
demonstrate employability, and thus a lack of total and permanent disability); Obradovich 
v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 48 F. App’x 255 (9th Cir. 2003) (alleging that 
the board erred when it submitted to a MAP only the question of whether the plaintiff was 
disabled, and not the question of when he became disabled); Youso v. Bert Bell NFL Player 
Ret. Plan, 242 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 1999) (alleging board error in relying on medical evidence 
indicating that only part of plaintiff’s injuries were covered under the plan); Sweeney v. 
Bert Bell NFL Player Ret. Plan, 156 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 1998) (alleging error when the board 
awarded a lower class of benefits to a plaintiff based on evidence that the plaintiff was 
capable of earning income, and was therefore not totally and permanently disabled); Smith 
v. Bell, 125 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1997) (alleging that the board erred when it relied on medical 
evidence to determine later onset date of total and permanent disability than claimed by 
plaintiff); Brumm v. Bert Bell NFL Ret. Plan, 995 F.2d 1433 (8th. Cir. 1993) (arguing that the 
board erred when it applied an unreasonable interpretation of the plan language, resulting 
in an arbitrary and capricious denial of benefits); Green v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL 
Player Ret. Plan, No. CIV.A.3:98-CV-2235-D 1999 WL 417925 (N.D. Tex June 22, 1999) 
(arguing that the board erred when it interpreted plan language to determine that the 
plaintiff was not vested for purposes of meeting plan benefit criteria). 
109 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2000) (presenting congressional findings that access to federal 
courts is necessary for proper adjudication of claims of improper benefit denials).  Like 
many retirement and welfare benefit plans, the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle Ret. Plan is governed 
by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”).  Id.  See also NFLPA 
WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 11–12. 
110  NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 12. 
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the Plan.111  Although each of these appeals varies based on the specific 
facts, a significant number of these appeals have centered on recurrent 
issues that mandate further discussion in order to better understand the 
issues to which the NFLPA and its members seek resolution.112 
The most frequent allegations to appear in appeals of benefit denials 
by the Bell/Rozelle Plan board are those of abuse of discretion in 
denying the claim.113  Because the Bell/Rozelle Plan is considered an 
“employee welfare benefit plan” as defined by ERISA, the plan is subject 
to governance by ERISA, and its administrators are subject to the 
fiduciary standards imposed by ERISA.114  As such, judicial review of 
retirement board decisions claimed to result from abuse of discretion are 
subject to ERISA’s standard of review as interpreted by the United States 
                                                 
111 Id.  See also Jani, 209 F. App’x 305.  Jani is the appeal filed by the estate of the late “Iron 
Mike” Webster, center for the Pittsburgh Steelers from 1974 through 1988.  Id.  at 307.  The 
Jani court upheld a district court ruling that the board abused its discretion in denying 
Webster a higher level of benefits.  Id. at 320.  Jani is the only case in which a final 
disposition has ruled in favor of the appealing player and not the plan. 
112 See infra note 113 (discussing cases which deal with the issue of abuse of discretion by 
the retirement board in denying claims). 
113 The following cases all had as the primary issue allegations of abuse of discretion by 
the board in denying claims for benefits.  See Washington, 504 F.3d 818; Jani, 209 F. App’x 
305; Johnson, 468 F.3d 1082; Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 410 F.3d 
1173 (9th Cir. 2005); Williams, 61 F. App’x 362; Obradovich, 48 F. App’x 255; Courson v. Bert 
Bell NFL Player Ret. Plan, 214 F.3d 136 (3d. Cir. 2000); Youso, 242 F.3d 379; Sweeney, 156 
F.3d 1238; Smith, 125 F.3d 859; Brumm, 995 F.2d 1433; Green, No. CIV.A.3:98-CV-2235-D 
1999 WL 417925. 
114 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(1) (2000).  ERISA’s 
coverage extends to employee welfare benefit plans, as included in the following 
definition: 
 The terms “employee welfare benefit plan” and " “welfare plan”  
mean any plan, fund, or program which was heretofore or is hereafter 
established or maintained by an employer or by an employee 
organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund, or program 
was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for its 
participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or 
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits 
in the event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, 
or vacation benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day 
care centers, scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services, or (B) any 
benefit described in section 186(c) of this title (other than pensions on 
retirement or death, and insurance to provide such pensions). 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).  The definition of “employee welfare benefit plan” explicitly covers 
plans created under 29 U.S.C. § 186(c), the codified location of § 302(c) of the original Taft-
Hartley legislation, and thus reaches the Bell/Rozelle Plan by explicit reference.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 1002(1). 
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Supreme Court in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch.115  In Firestone, the 
Court determined that, unlike a federal appellate court’s review of a 
district court’s grant of summary judgment—which is subject to a de 
novo standard—the review of a plan administrator’s decision may be 
subject to a less-exacting standard.116  The Firestone Court held that, 
where a plan bestows upon its administrator or fiduciary the discretion 
to interpret the plan and determine eligibility for benefits, the 
administrator’s determinations will not be reviewed under the de novo 
standard but will instead be reviewed under an abuse of discretion 
standard.117 
In Courson v. Bert Bell NFL Retirement Plan,118 the Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit reviewed the Bell Retirement Plan board’s denial of 
benefits to former Pittsburgh Steelers and Tampa Bay Buccaneers 
offensive lineman Stephen Courson under the standard mandated by 
Firestone.119  The Courson court articulated the highly deferential abuse of 
discretion standard as proper when reviewing a determination of the 
Bell/Rozelle Plan board.120  As referenced in Courson, the standard 
requires that a plan administrator’s decision “may be disturbed only if it 
is without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence, or erroneous as 
a matter of law.”121  In addition to Courson, many other courts reviewing 
claims by former players who were denied benefits have also indicated 
that the above articulation of the abuse of discretion standard is 
proper.122  The Court in Courson further reasoned that a decision is 
                                                 
115  489 U.S. 101 (1989).  In Firestone, the Court granted certiorari to determine the proper 
standard of review for a federal court when a plan administrator, trustee, or beneficiary 
challenges an administrative determination relating to interpretation of the plan.  Id. at 108. 
116 See id. at 115 (discussing the availability of a less-invasive standard of review when 
the plan has entrusted the administrator or fiduciary with discretionary authority to review 
eligibility and interpret plan provisions).  See also Canseco v. Constr. Laborers Pension 
Trust for S. Cal., 93 F.3d. 600, 605 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing the abuse of discretion 
standard as the proper standard of review for plans entrusting discretion to fiduciaries). 
117 Firestone, 498 U.S. at 115.  The Firestone Court discusses the origin of the arbitrary and 
capricious standard as a means for a federal court to assert jurisdiction over suits against 
plans arising under the section § 302(c) exceptions in the LMRA.  Id. at 109.  See also Van 
Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees’ Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048 (7th Cir. 1987). 
118 214 F.3d 136 (3d. Cir. 2000). 
119 See id. at 142 (citing Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 437–38, n.4 (3d. Cir. 
1997) (citing Firestone, 498 U.S. at 115)). 
120 See Courson, 214 F.3d at 142.  Cf. Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Ret. Plan, 
410 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115; Jones v. Laborers Health 
and Welfare Trust Fund, 906 F.3d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1990)) (indicating that a collectively-
bargained for review process and grant of discretion to plan administrators will not be 
upset by the courts unless an abuse of discretion is obvious). 
121 See Courson, 214 F.3d at 142 (quotations omitted). 
122 See Jani v. Bell, 209 F. App’x 305, 320 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming a district court decision 
finding that the board did abuse its discretion when it denied benefits absent the support of 
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“supported by ‘substantial evidence [only] if there is sufficient evidence 
for a reasonable person to agree with the decision.’”123  The abuse of 
discretion standard was further clarified in Youso v. Bert Bell NFL 
Retirement Plan124 where the court held that in applying the standard a 
court must not substitute its own weighing of the evidence for the 
weighing done by the plan administrator.125  Rather, the court must 
                                                                                                             
any substantial evidence); Johnson v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 468 F.3d. 
1082, 1088 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming a finding that the board did not abuse its discretion 
when it relied on substantial evidence that a former player was gainfully employed and 
was not totally and permanently disabled, based on MAP reports); Williams v. Bert 
Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 61 F. App’x 362, 362–63 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that the board did not abuse its discretion in denying benefits when it reasonably relied on 
substantial evidence that player was capable of sedentary work to demonstrate 
employability, and thus has a lack of total and permanent disability); Obradovich v. Bert 
Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 48 F. App’x 255, 257 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
the board’s decision was reasonable and supported by substantial evidence when a MAP 
opinion was followed on the question of whether the plaintiff was disabled); Youso v. Bert 
Bell NFL Player Ret. Plan, 242 F.3d 379, 379 (8th Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court’s 
ruling that the board did not abuse its discretion in denying benefits based on substantial 
medical evidence that only part of the plaintiff’s injuries were covered under the plan); 
Sweeney v. Bert Bell NFL Player Ret. Plan, 156 F.3d 1238, 1238 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that 
the board did not abuse its discretion when it awarded a lower class of benefits to the 
plaintiff based on substantial evidence that the plaintiff was capable of earning income, and 
was therefore not totally and permanently disabled); Smith v. Bell, 125 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 
1997) (holding that the board did not abuse its discretion when it relied on substantial 
medical evidence to determine later onset date of total and permanent disability than 
claimed by the plaintiff); Brumm v. Bert Bell NFL Ret. Plan, 995 F.2d 1433, 1440 (8th. Cir. 
1993) (holding that the board did abuse its discretion when it applied an unreasonable 
interpretation of the plan language, resulting in an arbitrary and capricious denial of 
benefits); Green v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, No. CIV.A.3:98-CV-2235-D 
1999 WL 417925, at *4 (N.D. Tex 1999) (holding that the board did not abuse its discretion 
when it relied on a reasonable interpretation of plan requirements to determine that the 
plaintiff was not vested for purposes of meeting plan benefit criteria). 
123 Courson, 214 F.3d at 142 (citing Daniels v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 758 F. Supp. 326, 331 
(W.D. Pa. 1991)).  The court ultimately upheld the retirement board’s decision to deny 
benefits to Courson when it found that the board went to great lengths to gather 
substantial evidence, medical and non-medical, that it then reasonably relied on to deny 
the claim.  Id. at 148.  See also Johnson, 468 F.3d 1082, 1085 (holding that a finding by the 
district court of no abuse of discretion will be upheld if a reasonable person could have 
reached a similar decision as the board based on the available evidence, not if a reasonable 
person would have reached a similar decision (emphasis supplied)).  See generally Courson, 
214 F.3d at 146.  Courson claimed that, inter alia, the board’s denial of benefits was 
arbitrary and capricious when it disregarded his contention that the Steelers’ policy of 
furnishing a maximum of two beers per player following home games was evidence of 
League facilitation and supervision of Courson’s alcoholism.  
124 242 F. 3d 379. 
125 See id. (explaining that although the court might reach a different conclusion when 
reviewing the evidence anew, the court is constrained to review the board’s evaluation 
when the board is given discretion to decide claims).  But cf. Green, 1999 WL 417925 at *2 
(indicating that although the court is bound to apply the abuse of discretion standard in 
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evaluate the administrator’s review of evidence, although it may 
consider outside evidence to determine whether abuse of discretion 
occurred.126 When a court reviews a denial of benefits for abuse of 
discretion, a finding that the decision reached by the board was directly 
contrary to the evidence in the record will not automatically indicate an 
abuse of discretion.127  In Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players 
Retirement Plan,128 the court laid out a slightly different abuse of 
discretion standard when it held that an ERISA administrative board 
abuses its discretion only when it “(1) renders a decision without 
explanation, (2) construes provisions of the plan in a way that conflicts 
with the plain language of the plan, or (3) relies on clearly erroneous 
findings of fact.”129  The Boyd court continued, indicating that “[a] 
finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support 
it, the reviewing [body of] the entire evidence is left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”130  Thus, the Boyd 
court illustrates the incredibly stringent standard of proof that a former 
player appealing the board’s decision must meet if the player is to 
prevail on an abuse of discretion claim.131 
                                                                                                             
determining whether the plan administrator’s review of the evidence was arbitrary and 
capricious, the court may consider evidence outside the administrative record to evaluate 
whether the board abused its discretion). 
126 Youso, 242 F.3d at 379; see also Green, 1999 WL 417925 at *2. 
127 Boyd v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Players Ret. Plan, 410 F.3d 1173, 1178 (9th Cir. 
2005) (quoting Taft v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 9 F.3d 1469, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993)).  
The Boyd court held that a decision contrary to the evidence in the record must be 
accompanied by a lack of explanation, a misconstruing of the plain language of the plan, or 
a reliance on clearly erroneous findings of fact.  Boyd, 410 F.3d at 1178 (citing Bendixen v. 
Standard Ins. Co., 185 F.3d 939, 944 (9th Cir. 1999); Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co., 45 F.3d 
1317, 1323–24 (9th Cir. 1995)).  The Boyd court also held that a fiduciary under ERISA is 
under obligation to guard the assets of the plan against claims that are improper.  Boyd, 410 
F.3d at 1178.  In addition, the court held that an ERISA fiduciary is under a similar 
obligation to pay claims that are legitimate.  Id.  Further, Boyd held that the primary goal of 
ERISA was to provide a method of dispute resolution for workers and beneficiaries that 
was both inexpensive and expeditious.  Id.  By applying a standard of review deferential to 
the board, the court assists in furthering that goal.  Id. 
128 410 F.3d 1173. 
129 Id. at 1178. 
130 Id. (alteration in original). 
131 See McCann, supra note 79, at 3.  McCann discusses the test laid out in Boyd requiring a 
finding of either a decision without explanation, a misconstruing of the plain language of 
the plan, or a reliance on clearly erroneous findings of fact.  Id.  McCann continues, 
indicating that given the deference typically afforded to ERISA plan fiduciaries, proving 
any one of the three elements of the test from Boyd is highly unlikely.  Id.  As such, McCann 
asserts that an appeal to the federal court system is not likely, except in clear cut-situations, 
to net a victory over the board for a retired player.  See id. at 4 (discussing the improbability 
of reversal on appeal).  
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Although allegations of abuse of discretion in denying claims are the 
most common procedural complaints on appeal, the most common 
substantive complaint accompanying these allegations is erroneous 
determination of the onset date of disabilities for purposes of retroactive 
payment.132  The Bell/Rozelle Plan allows the board to seek the 
evaluation of a medical advisory physician (“MAP”) when the board is 
deadlocked on a claim over a medical issue, and the MAP determination 
is binding on the board.133  However, confusion as to the proper 
solicitation of a MAP opinion has resulted in onset date appeals.134  In 
Obradovich v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan,135 the Ninth 
Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling that the board did not abuse its 
                                                 
132 Many of the appeals filed by former players do not allege a total denial of benefits, but 
rather allege that the board awarded benefits erroneously with respect to determining 
when the disability first occurred.  See, eg., Washington v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL 
Player Ret. Plan, 504 F.3d. 818 (9th Cir. 2007) (challenging the board’s failure to follow 
precedent when determining criteria for awarding benefits retroactively); Jani v. Bell, 209 F. 
App’x 305, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (challenging the board’s determination that a lower class of 
benefits was proper when it failed to consider evidence that would have placed the onset 
date of injury within the window for a higher class of benefits); Johnson v. Bert Bell/Pete 
Rozelle NFL Player Ret. Plan, 468 F.3d. 1082, 1086–87 (8th Cir. 2006) (alleging that the 
board erroneously relied on evidence of a player’s capability for earning income as 
sufficient to deny retroactive benefits); Boyd, 410 F.3d at 1177 (alleging that the board erred 
in denying a lower level of benefits when it determined that player’s disability arose from 
events occurring following his NFL playing career); Obradovich v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle 
NFL Player Ret. Plan, 48 F. App’x 255 (9th Cir. 2002) (alleging that the board erred in 
submitting only the question of whether the player was disabled, and not when he became 
disabled, to the MAP physician); Courson v. Bert Bell NFL Player Ret. Plan, 214 F.3d 136, 
141 (3d. Cir. 2000) (alleging that the board erred in attributing player’s alcohol-related 
disabilities to events occurring after his NFL playing career had ended, resulting in a lower 
level of benefits); Youso v. Bert Bell NFL Player Ret. Plan, 242 F.3d 379 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(alleging that the board erred when it determined that a fall happening almost fifteen years 
following the end of the player’s career was not the result of football injuries, despite 
evidence that the fall occurred as a result of a disability directly linked to a football injury); 
Sweeney v. Bert Bell NFL Player Ret. Plan, 156 F.3d 1238 (9th Cir. 1998) (alleging board 
error in a finding that sporadic work resulting in minimally gainful employment was 
sufficient to determine that a player was not totally and permanently disabled during a 
certain period); Smith v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Ret. Plan, 125 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(alleging that the board erred when it determined that the onset date of disability was 
many years after the on-field injury that ended the player’s career, despite evidence that 
the player had found work as an actor and talent agent in the seven years following the end 
of his NFL playing career). 
133 NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 12.  A MAP’s opinion will almost always resolve 
a conflict.  Id. 
134 In Obradovich, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a former player’s claim that the board had 
abused its discretion in not following a MAP’s determination of the onset date of 
Obradovich’s disability.  48 F.Appx. at 256.  See also Johnson, 468 F.3d. at 1086 (alleging that 
the MAP opinion sought by the board was not as thorough or substantial as the board 
would need to realistically review the plaintiff’s claim for benefits). 
135 48 F. App’x 255. 
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discretion when it declined to follow a MAP’s opinion, thus reiterating 
the board’s wide discretion in determining an applicant’s qualifications 
for disability benefits.136  The court indicated that the board submitted to 
the MAP only a question as to whether Obradovich met the plan’s 
definition for T&P disablement—not when he became totally and 
permanently disabled.137  The court determined that when the plan 
grants full discretion to approve claims to the board, this includes the 
right to employ available assistance (such as the MAP) only to the extent 
that the board deems necessary.138    
Although the NFLPA’s statement to Congress did not make facial 
allegations of breach of fiduciary duty by the NFL-appointed members 
of the plan administrative board, there appears to be an underlying 
concern regarding a potential conflict of interest giving rise to the denial 
of claims by these appointees.139  This type of concern has been litigated 
only one time by a former player appealing a denial of benefits.140  In 
                                                 
136 See id. at 256 (explaining the difference between determination of disability in general 
and determination of onset date). 
137  Id. at 256.  The court explains that the board, given its wide discretion in making 
benefit award determinations, may sever the question of whether a player meets the T&P 
disablement definition from the question of when that player actually became totally and 
permanently disabled.  Id.  If the board elects to separate these two questions, it retains its 
discretion to rule on the question it did not submit to the MAP.  Id.  Thus, if a board 
chooses, as the board in Obradovich did, to submit to the MAP only a question of whether 
the player meets the T&P qualifications, the board is under no obligation to rely on the 
MAP opinion as to when the disablement occurred.  Id.  If a player appeals the board 
decision in a case like this, the reviewing court may review the board’s decision only as to 
the question it submitted to the MAP (here the whether question) for abuse of discretion, 
and must give the board full deference with respect to the other question it chose not to 
submit (here the when question).  Id. 
138 See id. (discussing the plan provisions that allow the board to use a MAP to answer 
questions regarding certain medical issues, and the nature of the MAP determinations as 
binding on the board).  See also Johnson, 468 F.3d. at 1086; Courson v. Bert Bell NFL Player 
Ret. Plan, 214 F.3d 136, 144–45 (3d. Cir. 2000). 
139 See STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, supra note 4, at 3.  While Upshaw denied believing 
that any of the NFL-appointed fiduciaries breached their duty, there is likely no other 
explanation for his request that Congress actively legislate to remove the 302(c)(5) equal 
representation requirement.  Id.  Upshaw couched his request under the rubric of personal 
ability to understand the needs of disabled players when he said that the NFLPA 
appointees, as former players themselves, are better able to understand when benefits 
should be awarded.  Id.  Although he did not state this position overtly, Upshaw likely 
feared that, despite the fixed nature of employer contribution levels to the plan, the interest 
of the NFL appointed fiduciaries may sway to denying benefits surreptitiously, in an 
indirect effort to reduce the likelihood of future requests for increased contributions.  See id.  
140  See generally Johnson , 468 F.3d 1082.  The plaintiff in Johnson, former player Daniel 
Johnson, alleged abuse of discretion by the board when his claim for retroactive benefits 
was denied.  Id. at 1085.  Johnson argues, similar to the argument in Obradovich, that the 
board abused its discretion when it relied on a MAP for determination of only whether 
Johnson met the disability standards, but not for when his disability began.  Id. at 1086. 
Meyer: If Nobody Picks Up the Ball, Is It Really a Fumble, or Is It a Fo
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
1404 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
Johnson v. Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan,141 the court 
addressed whether a conflict of interest could exist on the board when 
the requirements of section 302 were followed, and held that equal 
representation of both parties on the board, combined with deadlock-
breaking procedures, sufficiently demonstrated that a conflict of interest 
was not present.142  Thus, compliance with the 302(c)(5) requirements for 
board composition has been held not to indicate a per se conflict of 
interest among the board, or even a suspicion of a conflict of interest.143 
3. The Current Controversy and Requested Remedy 
The NFLPA is presented with a unique problem pitting loyalty 
against its moral compass.144  The NFLPA and the NFL are equally 
represented on the Bell/Rozelle Plan administrative board, in 
compliance with 302(c)(5).145  The disability benefits are designed to 
assist former players, and yet the NFLPA, as equal administrator, only 
grants active players the right to vote in elections that impact the 
selection of NFLPA representatives on the retirement board.146  Retirees 
                                                 
141 468 F.3d 1082. 
142 Id.  Daniel Johnson appealed the district court’s ruling that the board did not abuse its 
discretion, arguing that a standard less deferential than the abuse of discretion standard 
should apply, because a potential conflict of interest was present.  Id. at 1086.  See also 
Tillery v. Hoffman Enclosures, Inc., 280 F.3d 1192, 1197 (8th. Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
presence of a conflict of interest may require the application of a less deferential standard).  
Johnson based his argument on the board’s composition, presumably contending that the 
NFL-appointed members had a conflict of interest between upholding their fiduciary duty 
to the beneficiaries and serving the interests of the appointing party.  Johnson, 468 F.3d at 
1086.  The court, however, rejected Johnson’s argument and held that there was no conflict 
of interest because the board had equal representation of the NFL and NFLPA, was 
required to reach a majority vote on decisions, and had resources such as binding MAP 
decisions to break deadlocks.  Id. (citing Manny v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest 
Areas Pension and Health and Welfare Funds, 388 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 2004); Courson, 
214 F.3d at 143).  The court went on to say that the obvious lack of a conflict of interest 
required the application of the more deferential abuse of discretion standard when 
reviewing the board’s denial of benefits.  Id. 
143 Cf. Johnson, 468 F.3d at 1086.  Although the Johnson court does not reference the 
302(c)(5) requirements explicitly, there can be little doubt that the court was discussing 
these same requirements when explaining that equal representation and deadlock 
resolution procedures in the form of binding MAP opinions are indications that no conflict 
of interest could survive to negatively impact a beneficiary.  See id. 
144 See McCann, supra note 79, at 3 (discussing the various factors influencing the 
NFLPA’s representation of retirees). 
145 See discussion supra Part II.C.1 regarding the structure of the Bell/Rozelle Plan. 
146  See NFL PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION CONST. Article II Cl. 2.01. 
Any person who is employed as a professional football player by a 
member club of the NFL shall be eligible to be an active member of the 
NFLPA, including any player who is a party to an NFL Player 
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are thus unable to directly influence the selection of the representatives 
that the NFLPA appoints to the board.147  The outcry from retirees who 
have been denied benefits and claim the NFLPA is failing its moral 
duties is building at a fever pitch.148  In response, the NFLPA has said 
that it is committed to meeting the disability needs of the plan for which 
it bargained so stringently, and the presence of NFL-appointed 
representatives on the administrative board is the true cause of the 
denials.149  Thus, under the presumption that legislative action unmaking 
sixty years of valid law is the only viable solution to the problem, the 
NFLPA has asked Congress to alter section 302(c)(5) to allow the NFLPA 
to stack the board with only union appointees.150  It is the fourth quarter, 
and the two-minute drill down the slippery slope has begun. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Many disabled former players have no alternative but to wait 
anxiously, and perhaps indefinitely, as the NFLPA makes a ceremonial 
effort to improve access to benefits, while refusing to give the retirees 
any meaningful level of direct control over their future financial 
security.151  As discussed, the NFLPA asserts that its hands are tied by 
federal law; the problem of repeated denials of proper benefits will be 
solved only if Congress creates an exception for the NFLPA plan in 
                                                                                                             
Contract.  A player actively seeking employment as a professional 
football player shall also be eligible to be a member of the NFLPA. 
NFL PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION CONST. Article II Cl. 2.01 (2007).  See also NFL PLAYERS’ 
ASSOCIATION CONSTITUTION Article II. Cl. 2.11, which states that retired members of the 
NFLPA have the right to “be represented on the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFLPA Retirement 
Board by a retired member appointed by the NFLPA active Board of Player Representatives.”  
Id. at § 4 (emphasis added). 
147 See id. § 4. 
148 See generally McCann, supra note 79; O’Keefe, supra note 6; Les Carpenter, NFL 
Disability Plan Draws Congressional Attention, WASHINGTON POST, June 26, 2007, at E01; Les 
Carpenter, Plan Eases NFL Disability Process, WASHINGTON POST, June 21, 2007, at E01; 
Finder, supra note 7. 
149 See STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, supra note 4, at 3–4 (discussing the need for 
legislative elimination of section 302(c)(5)’s joint administration provision). 
150 Cf. id. at 3 (indicating that the presence of NFL appointees on the board is the sole 
cause of the NFLPA’s inability to award benefits at the levels requested by disabled 
players).  
151 See supra notes 6, 146 (discussing the laundry list of accusations leveled at the NFLPA 
by former players, including the most serious charge:  that the NFLPA is loyal only to its 
dues paying members—the current players—and has no incentive or desire to assist 
disabled retired players who are unable to work and in real danger of losing what little 
assets they have remaining). 
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response to the plan’s unique structure.152  However, the exception 
requested by the NFLPA calls for a total redaction of the section 302(c)(5) 
joint administration provision, a change that would undoubtedly have a 
significant impact on the entire organized labor community.153  Clearly, 
if a legislative solution to the plight of the former players is to be 
implemented, it must meet the specific needs of the NFLPA and also 
minimize the negative effects on the members of the labor community 
who benefit from section 302(c)(5)’s current form.154  Part III.A evaluates 
the reasoning behind the NFLPA’s request for change, while Part III.B 
analyzes the impact a legislative change to Section 302(c)(5) will have on 
the NFLPA and the general labor landscape as a whole.155 
A. Analyzing the NFLPA Argument in Support of Legislative Change 
The NFLPA has made a simple yet inescapably vague request that 
Congress enact legislation that amends or eliminates section 302(c)(5).156  
The late NFLPA Executive Director Gene Uphsaw stopped well short of 
a complete and thorough request for Congressional assistance when he 
asked for a solution only to the problems he claimed were caused by the 
joint administration requirement.157  Although the NFLPA offered no 
assistance to Congress in the form of a proposed legislative amendment 
or redaction, Upshaw did extend perfunctory courtesy by articulating 
the two negative impacts the NFLPA believes section 302(c)(5) has on its 
                                                 
152 See discussion supra section II.C.3 (detailing the implicit NFLPA contention that 
legislation allowing the NFLPA full control over the administration of the union’s 
disability plan is the only plausible solution to the problem). 
153 See discussion infra section III.B (detailing the widespread impact likely to result from 
a total legislative redaction of section 302(c)(5)). 
154 See discussion infra Part IV (discussing the minimal alterations to section 302(c)(5) that 
will accomplish the NFLPA’s goal of increased union control and prevent significant harm 
to other labor industries that benefit from 302(c)(5) as written). 
155 See infra Parts III.A, III.B (discussing a potential redaction of the joint administration 
provision of section 302(c)(5) and the ramifications of that redaction). 
156 See STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, supra note 4, at 3.  Upshaw made his request for 
legislative action with no accompanying suggestion to Congress as to how to rewrite or 
amend the statute to achieve the desired outcome.  Id. at 3–4.  As such, Congress is given 
only a result and is asked to formulate a legislative solution consistent with that result.  The 
vagueness with which Upshaw presented his request to Congress may provide fuel to the 
argument of former players who feel that the NFLPA is operating only on a self-serving 
basis, and is therefore not exerting extraordinary efforts to solve the problem.  See O’Keefe, 
supra note 6. 
157 See supra notes 149–50, 157 and accompanying text (discussing the vague request for a 
remedy). 
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ability to fairly administer the disability plan.158  First, Upshaw expressly 
denied suspicion that the NFL-appointees breached their fiduciary 
duties in denying benefits, but implied a conflict of interest between the 
NFL-appointees’ fiduciary duties and league interests through his 
statement indicating that the players are the party actually controlling 
contribution levels.159  Second, Upshaw argued that section 302(c)(5) is 
over-inclusive in that it does not consider that the players are the true 
decision-makers funding the system when it imposes the joint 
administration requirement.160 
From a textual perspective, the NFLPA’s argument that the NFL-
appointees breach their fiduciary duties to plan beneficiaries when 
denying benefits is at best clandestine, evidenced by Upshaw’s apparent 
fear of making an outright accusation.161  In fact, Upshaw blatantly 
denied espousing the belief that a conflict of interest exists among the 
NFL appointees.162  Yet, there appears to be no other viable explanation 
for the request that Congress remove the mandate that the NFLPA allow 
three NFL appointees to sit on the board.163  Surprisingly, given the 
fogginess of Upshaw’s accusations, there is some evidence to indicate a 
genuine reason for heightened concern.164 
Although Daniel Johnson is the only retired player to directly allege 
a conflict of interest on the board, the significant number of benefit 
denials and onset date/benefit level disputes can be circumstantially tied 
to the theory that NFL-appointees may be serving league interests when 
awarding lower benefit levels, or when denying benefits altogether.165  
The basis for this argument lies in the theory that the NFL has an interest 
                                                 
158 See STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, supra note 4, at 3–4 (defining the league 
contributions for the NFLPA plan as player-approved diversions of player income, and 
also vaguely skirting the issue of breach of fiduciary duty by league appointees). 
159 Id. at 3. 
160 Id. at 4. 
161 See O’Keefe, supra note 6, at 1 (discussing Gene Upshaw’s position that because the 
NFLPA is being blamed, improperly, for the denial of benefits, the NFLPA ought to have 
the sole voice in administering the plan). 
162 See STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, supra note 4, at 3 (denying that he believes a breach 
of fiduciary duty has occurred on the board). 
163 See supra note 139 and accompanying text (discussing the underlying perception of 
some level of bad faith on the part of the NFL-appointees, whether overt or subtle). 
164 See discussion infra Section III.A (discussing the appointment of the NFL 
representatives to the Plan board as creating conflicting fiduciary and agency relationships 
among these representatives, leading to the improper denial of benefits and a breach of 
fiduciary duty). 
165 See supra note 139 (discussing the possibility that NFL-appointees may advocate to the 
other board members a denial or reduction in benefit levels in the interest of limiting the 
increase in plan funding requests from the NFLPA when the next renegotiation of the 
collective bargaining agreement is imminent).  
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in limiting the number and value of disability awards in order to 
preserve similar contribution levels when the next collective bargaining 
agreement (“CBA”) is negotiated.166  By extension, the NFL-appointees 
are then induced by an illusory agency relationship to the NFL to further 
this interest by downgrading or voting against awards when possible.167  
Specifically, the collection of cases claiming minimal awards based on 
erroneous onset date determinations provide fodder for the conflict of 
interest theory.168  The concept is quite simple—the NFL-appointees are 
keenly aware of the track record of the federal courts in deferring to the 
board’s discretion on benefit determinations, and they use this deference 
to rely on insufficient evidence, knowing the likelihood of judicial 
reversal is slim.169  The NFLPA has not yet made this argument, nor is it 
likely to in such direct terms given the need to tread lightly in order to 
avoid a complete breakdown in future CBA negotiations. 
Although there is circumstantial support for the argument that the 
NFL-appointees are fulfilling the owners’ subversive motivations, the 
foundation for the argument is unstable at best.170  Most notably, the 
Court in Amax Coal expressly clarified the one-way street of a plan 
trustee’s loyalty when it held that “[u]nder principles of equity, a trustee 
bears an unwavering duty of complete loyalty to the beneficiary of the 
                                                 
166 See supra note 139.  The costs of benefits paid to disabled players come directly from 
the portion of shared revenues allocated for overall player compensation.  NFLPA WHITE 
PAPER, supra note 3, at 4.  Because the percentage allocated to player compensation is fixed 
in the CBA, there are no circumstances under which the owners will be required to increase 
contributions during the remaining active period of the current CBA.  Id.  Logic dictates, 
however, that if a significant spike in paid benefits occurs, the NLFPA will likely insist on a 
higher percentage of shared revenues for player compensation in order to cover the 
increase in benefits costs, rather than asking the current players to defer a greater 
percentage of their compensation to the plan.  See id., at 4–5 (discussing the increase in 
benefits obtained by the NFLPA  over the years as successive CBAs were negotiated).  
167 See supra note 139. 
168 See supra note 132 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of challenges to 
onset state determinations, and specifically, the sparing use of MAP opinions when 
deciding medical questions of the existence and onset date of a disability). 
169 But cf. Johnson v. Bell, 468 F.3d 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing the presumption 
that the board acts with discretion, and the granting of deference to board decisions, as 
tenets of the concept of fiduciary status and duty in America.)  Furthermore, the Johnson 
court appeared to indicate that the board’s compliance with section 302(c)(5) is an 
indication of a per se lack of conflicting interest, thus painting the requirements of 302(c)(5) 
as the sole indicators of proper fulfillment of fiduciary duty to plan beneficiaries.  Id. at 
1086. 
170 See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text (discussing the equal representation 
provision as a nearly flawless safeguard against the infiltration of conflicting interests, 
resulting in a heavy burden of proof for the NFLPA to sustain the argument). 
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trust, to the exclusion of the interests of all other parties.”171  While a 
NFL-appointed trustee is only human, and therefore susceptible to the 
temptation to serve league interests, the disincentive to doing so was 
made quite powerful by the Amax Coal Court’s holding that enforcement 
of the rule against division of loyalties is to be nothing less than 
inflexible.172  Additionally, Amax Coal removed any doubt as to the 
availability of punishment for violation of the prohibition against dual 
loyalties when it held that ERISA expressly incorporated the implicit 
fiduciary duties of 302(c)(5).173 
Given the stiff penalties imposed by ERISA for a breach of fiduciary 
duty, it is unlikely that any of the NFL-appointed trustees would risk 
advancing the NFL’s interests over those of the fund beneficiaries.174  The 
plan’s requirement that any award or denial of benefits be the decision of 
a majority of the board further diminishes the probability that a conflict 
of interest could impact the board’s decision.175  The possibility of 
coercion on the part of the NFL-appointees notwithstanding, the only 
remaining impact a conflict of interest could possibly have is to force a 
board deadlock and, in turn, a submission of the claim to a MAP.176  
Given the extremely rare necessity for arbitration of board deadlocks, the 
                                                 
171 National Labor Relations Board v. Amax Coal, 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981).  See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS:  DUTY OF LOYALTY § 170(1), supra note 64. 
172 Amax Coal, 453 U.S. at 329–30.  “To deter the trustee from all temptation and to 
prevent any possible injury to the beneficiary, the rule against a trustee dividing his 
loyalties must be enforced with ‘uncompromising rigidity.’”  Id. (quoting Meinhard v. 
Salmon, 164 N.E 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.)).  The Amax Coal court expounds on 
this idea when it holds that, “[a] fiduciary cannot contend ‘that, although he had conflicting 
interests, he served his masters equally well or that his primary loyalty was not weakened 
by the pull of his secondary one[.]’”  Amax Coal, 453 U.S. at 330 (quoting Woods v. City 
National Bank & Trust Co., 312 U.S. 262, 269 (1941)). 
173 See supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing the codification of section 
302(c)(5)’s fiduciary standards in ERISA and ERISA’s function as an insulator of trust 
interests from those of the employer). 
174 See Fogdall, supra note 36, at 234 (discussing the sufficiency of ERISA’s penal scheme 
for deterring a breach of fiduciary duty by a union head, and indicating the superfluous 
nature of section 302(c)(5) in this regard). 
175 See STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, supra note 4, at 3–4 (discussing the requirement that 
a majority of the board agree before a result will be entered awarding or denying benefits).  
See also Johnson v. Bell, 468 F.3d. 1082, 1086 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing the deadlock 
resolution procedures of the plan as preventing tainted claim outcomes resulting from a 
conflict of interest on the board). 
176 See NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 12  A non-medical board deadlock is not 
submitted to a MAP, but is rather submitted to a binding arbiter.  See id. at 11–12 
(indicating that a resort to binding arbitration to resolve a deadlock between members of 
the board on a non-medical question is extremely rare, having been necessary only one 
time since the early 1990s). 
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majority vote requirement seems to be functioning as a supplementary 
deterrent to allowing a conflict of interest to influence board votes.177 
Although the conflict of interest argument has not been overtly 
asserted by the NFLPA, a feasible alternative argument suggests that the 
Bell/Rozelle Plan is outside the scope of section 302(c)(5).178  The 
argument posits that, due to the structure of the contributions in the 
Bell/Rozelle Plan as voluntary deferments by the players, the Plan itself 
should not be governed by section 302(c)(5).179  This argument indicates 
that the funds contributed are no longer attributable to the owners, 
thereby removing them from section 302(c)(5) control.180  Viewed in a 
light most favorable to the players, it is conceivable that the structure of 
the contribution system would place the NFLPA plan outside the scope 
of not only the 302(c)(5) exception, but also the general section 302 
prohibition on payments.181  If the NFLPA could successfully make this 
                                                 
177 NFLPA WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 12 (indicating that only once in the fourteen 
year period from 1993–2007 has the arbitration procedure been necessary to break a 
deadlock on the board). 
178 See STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, supra note 4, at 3–4 (arguing that the NLFPA plan is 
different from those intended to be governed by 302(c)(5) in that the players are funding 
the system through payroll deferrals of pre-negotiated owner contributions to the overall 
player compensation pot, and thus the players should retain complete fiduciary 
responsibility for the administration of the fund). 
179 See id. (arguing that because active players fund the system through payroll 
deferments, active players should be given complete control over the administration of the 
fund).  The structure of the NFL’s compensation system is quite different from the plans 
collectively bargained for in other industries that employ union labor.  See NFLPA WHITE 
PAPER, supra note 3, at 4 (discussing the pre-negotiation of revenue sharing percentages 
dedicated to player compensation).  This differs from the more typical negotiations in most 
organized labor unions, where the union negotiates compensation levels directly, as 
opposed to negotiating a pool of revenues available for employers to use when bargaining 
with individual employees for compensation.  Id.  The NFL CBA currently allots sixty 
percent of the league’s shareable revenues for player compensation.  Id.  Of that allotment, 
active players collectively choose what percentage will be deferred to the retirement and 
disability plans for use by former players.  Id.  During 2006, active player deferments to the 
plan totaled $147.5 million, an average deferment of $82,000 annually by each active player.  
Id.  Of the $147.5 million in deferments, $20 million was earmarked specifically for 
disability payments for former players, while $96.5 million went to retirement benefits, and 
the remaining $31 million went to specific medical benefits in the areas of health 
reimbursement accounts, a special dementia health plan, and a program of fully-paid 
health-care premiums for the first five years following retirement.  Id. 
180 See id. 
181 See 29 U.S.C. § 186 (2000).  See also discussion supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the 
prohibition of payments as a tool to forestall union extortion, employer coercion, and union 
abuse of welfare benefit funds).  Section 302 would seem to be out of bounds in situations 
where employees are collectively deferring portions of their guaranteed income to a 
welfare benefit plan for the sole and exclusive benefit of that same body of employees. See 
Note, supra note 37, at 741–742 (discussing the limited scope of section 302 and the 
possibility that the proscription of payments may not govern those situations where the 
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argument, then the need to petition Congress to alter section 302 is 
extinguished.  Yet, the argument has been advanced only implicitly, 
ironically in Gene Upshaw’s statement asking Congress for legislative 
action.182  Moving forward, the legislative alternative for resolution of 
the NFLPA’s conundrum must be analyzed for its impact on the 
country’s labor climate.183 
B. Legislative Redaction of the Joint Administration Provision 
The legislative change requested by the NFLPA would, on its face, 
alter only one element in the four exception criteria of section 302(c)(5).184  
The redaction of only the joint administration requirement would leave 
intact the remaining section 302(c)(5) safeguards intended by 
Congress.185  Although the NFLPA believes this change would bolster its 
                                                                                                             
union officials are acting as independent fiduciaries rather than bargaining 
representatives).  
182 See STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, supra note 4, at 3–4 (discussing the Bell/Rozelle 
Plan’s status as potentially outside the control of section 302(c)(5)). 
183 See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing the removal of the joint administration 
requirement of 302(c)(5)). 
184 See STATEMENT OF GENE UPSHAW, supra note 4, at 3 (requesting removal of the joint 
administration provision).  See also supra notes 45–48 and accompanying text (discussing 
the existing-fund criteria that the funds be held in trust for the sole benefit of the employee, 
that the contribution structure be memorialized in a written agreement, that the parties be 
equally represented in the administration of the fund with deadlock resolution provisions, 
and that the fund be subject to an annual audit to ensure compliance with good faith 
management requirements). 
185 An amended, section 302(c)(5) would likely appear as follows if Congress acquiesced 
to the NFLPA request: 
The provisions of this section shall not be applicable . . .  
 . . .  
(5) with respect to money or other thing of value paid to a trust fund 
established by such representative, for the sole and exclusive benefit of 
the employees of such employer, and their families and dependents (or 
of such employees, families, and dependents jointly with the 
employees of other employers making similar payments, and their 
families and dependents):  Provided, That (A) such payments are held 
in trust for the purpose of paying, either from principal or income or 
both, for the benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for 
medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death of 
employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from 
occupational activity or insurance to provide any of the foregoing, or 
unemployment benefits or life insurance, disability and sickness 
insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such 
payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the 
employer, and such agreement provides that an impartial umpire will be 
chosen by the board members to decide any disputes resulting in deadlock 
among the board members on issues of administration of the fund and 
employees and employers are equally represented in the 
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ability to approve a greater number of legitimate disability claims, 
considering only this singular outcome and the textually minimal nature 
of the change clouds any potential impact on nearly every employee 
welfare benefit plan subject to section 302(c)(5).186  As such, an evaluation 
of the strengths and weaknesses of this argument cannot exist in a 
vacuum; it must also consider the wider impact the change would have 
on union laborers in positions less advantageous than those of NFL 
players.187  Part III.B.1 evaluates the potential positive impacts to the 
Bell/Rozelle Plan as a result of legislative change.188  Part III.B.2 
evaluates the argument that the removal of the joint administration 
provision will improve the retirement/disability system for organized 
labor in general.189  In contrast, Part III.B.3 evaluates the argument that 
removing the joint administration provision will harm the system.190 
                                                                                                             
administration of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the 
representatives of the employers and the representatives of employees 
may agree upon and in the event the employer and employee groups 
deadlock on the administration of such fund and there are no neutral 
persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agreement provides 
that the two groups shall agree on an impartial umpire to decide such 
dispute, or in event of their failure to agree on an umpire within a 
reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute 
shall, on petition of the board either group, be appointed by the district 
court of the United States for the district where the trust fund has its 
principal office, and shall also contain provisions for an annual audit 
of the trust fund, a statement of the results of which shall be available 
for inspection by interested persons at the principal office of the trust 
fund and at such other places as may be designated in such written 
agreement; and (C) such payments as are intended to be used for the 
purpose of providing pensions or annuities for employees are made to 
a separate trust which provides that the funds held therein cannot be 
used for any purpose other than paying such pensions or 
annuities[] . . .  
Text to be deleted from section 302(c)(5) is indicated by strikethrough, while textual 
changes necessary to grammatically clarify and retain the other safeguards are indicated by 
italics. 
186 Cf. Fogdall, supra note 36, at 219 (discussing that although the modern growth of 
privately held pension funds that are not subject to section 302(c)(5) control has 
substantially outpaced the growth of section 302(c)(5) funds, the investments held in 
section 302(c)(5) funds are still substantial and worthy of serious consideration). 
187 See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the longevity of section 302(c)(5) and the NFLPA’s 
status as only one of a multitude of unions governed by it). 
188 See discussion infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the impact a change in 302(c)(5) would 
have on the NFLPA’s administration of the Bell/Rozelle Plan). 
189 See discussion infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the positive impacts of removing the joint 
administration provision and vesting sole control of plans in the hands of labor unions). 
190 See discussion infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the negative impacts of removing the joint 
administration provision). 
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1. Would the NFLPA’s Requested Change Really Work? 
Before the wider impact of the change is discussed, it is prudent to 
ask whether the requested change would actually give the NFLPA the 
result it seeks.191  The NFLPA, in its furtive argument in favor of the 
change, has offered cloaked and circumstantial evidence that a conflict of 
interest could no longer impact a board decision if the board was 
composed of only union-appointees.192  While the proposed result is not 
untenable, both congressional and judicial findings over the last sixty 
years indicate that the reasoning suffers from a potentially fatal 
assumption.193  Congress explicitly stated its concern that the natural 
power-seeking instinct of labor unions rendered them fundamentally ill-
equipped to administer welfare benefit plans.194  Even unions that 
appeared wholly dedicated to operating legitimate funds for the sole 
benefit of their members were only one corrupt leader removed from 
potential extortion and abuse.195  Thus, in Congress’s view, unions are 
inherently flawed with respect to their ability to successfully act as plan 
fiduciaries, and the joint administration provision was seen as a viable 
solution.196  Additionally, the holding of Associated Contractors of Essex 
County, Inc.197 reasserted the notion that not only is the joint 
administration provision vital to the protection scheme, but the sheer 
volume of legislative history authenticates Congress’s careful 
consideration of the provision.198  In contravention of congressional 
                                                 
191 Without some possibility that the change will allow the NFLPA to approve more 
legitimate claims at the proper level than the current board, there would be no evidentiary 
compulsion for Congress to entertain the idea of legislative action.  But cf. STATEMENT OF 
GENE UPSHAW, supra note 3 (claiming that the change will help, but offering no evidence to 
Congress to support the claim). 
192 See supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text (discussing the argument that the NFL 
appointees act covertly as agents for the NFL, in conflict with their fiduciary duties to the 
beneficiaries of the Bell/Rozelle Plan). 
193 See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s finding of a dire 
need to prevent abuse of welfare funds by fund fiduciaries).  See also supra notes 69–70 and 
accompanying text (discussing the importance of the joint administration requirement to 
Congress’s protective scheme). 
194 See supra notes 41–42 (discussing Congressional understanding that allowing even 
apparently honest unions to have sole control over administration of funds is a dangerous 
idea considering the natural union motivation to seek power through forceful 
manipulation of its members’ interest in financial security for retirement). 
195 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
196 See supra note 37. 
197 Associated Contractors of Essex County, Inc. v. Laborers Int’l Union of N. America, 
559 F.2d 222 (3d. Cir. 1977). 
198 See supra note 70 (discussing the Associated Contractors opinion indicating that the joint 
administration was a carefully considered preventive measure and was not the result of a 
rogue legislator or an over-protective Congress). 
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misgivings about a union’s ability to act as a sole fiduciary, the NFLPA 
apparently believes that it is not susceptible to these abusive 
predispositions.199  However, NFLPA policy preventing retirees from 
voting on important matters that may impact the selection of union-
appointed plan fiduciaries is evidence that the NFLPA, like so many 
other unions, suffers from the same fatal flaws recognized by Congress 
several generations ago.200 
Putting the potential benefit, or lack thereof, to the NFLPA aside, 
Congress would be remiss if it proceeded with a redaction of the joint 
administration provision absent careful consideration of the potential 
impact the change would have on members of labor unions generally.  
On the one hand, wiping the legislative slate of what has been called a 
restrictive, superfluous, and temporary provision may create a wider 
range of opportunities for unions to serve the unique needs of their 
members.201  On the other hand, removal of such a long-standing and 
carefully targeted provision may invite the type of rampant abuse 
capable of ruining the financial well-being of a hefty portion of 
America’s union-workers.202 
2. Removing 302(c)(5) will Improve the Pension/Disability System 
Although the congressional debates and findings surrounding the 
passage of section 302(c)(5) focused heavily on prevention of the kind of 
power-mongering exhibited in the United Mine Workers incident, later 
examination has revealed that this specific incident may have been used 
by the bill’s proponents to wag the dog and create false hysteria against 
union power.203  If this is truly the case, opponents of section 302(c)(5)’s 
                                                 
199 See discussion supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the NFLPA’s belief that,  because its 
members are the ones being hurt, it will naturally feel compelled to come to their aid).  See 
also O’Keefe, supra note 6, at 1; Fogdall, supra note 36, at 227 (discussing the nature of the 
union as inherently protective of its own members, and motivated by threat of overthrow 
to comply with its members’ wishes). 
200 See supra note 146 (discussing the structure of member voting rights in the NFLPA).  
See also discussion supra Part II.A.2 (discussing the nature of labor unions as being 
predisposed to usurp control of pension funds to the eventual detriment of the 
beneficiaries). 
201 See generally Fogdall, supra note 36 (discussing the need to legislatively redact all of 
section 302 in order to improve the disability/pension system in organized labor). 
202 See supra note 40 (discussing the abuse of pension funds as a very real fear, and the 
long-term need to prevent this type of abuse). 
203 See Fogdall, supra note 36, at 223 (discussing the United Mine Workers strike and 
indicating that although Congress saw this event as indicative of a real problem of union-
abuse, the actual details of the fund sought and agreed to by union head John Lewis did 
include a joint administration requirement, along with the other safeguards Congress 
enacted in 302(c)(5)).  In other words, the notion that section 302(c)(5) was the result of a 
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restrictions may have a valid contention that the provision is nothing 
more than a superfluous overreaction.204  Opponents of section 302(c)(5) 
argue that the joint administration requirement falsely assumes that 
employers contributing to union welfare funds will desire to have partial 
control over that fund.205  Because employers are more concerned with 
running their businesses than with the management of union benefit 
funds, employees will receive better representation of their interests if 
unions are given sole administrative control.206  Thus, repeal of the joint 
administration requirement may result in better investments and benefit 
access for beneficiaries, and less of a burden on employers.207 
Human nature dictates that it is unrealistic to assume that people 
will behave selfishly at every turn, and that a blanket prohibition on all 
instances of a certain behavior is the only way to counteract this negative 
side effect of fallibility.208  Though born of a serious concern for the 
security of plan beneficiaries, the prohibition of joint administration not 
only assumes the worst from union trustees, but also purports to address 
the abuse tied to one specific union.209  The unrealistic assumption that 
all union controlled plans will be abused unfairly penalizes those unions 
that have not breached their fiduciary obligations to the beneficiaries.210  
Yet again, a repeal of the joint administration provision may serve to 
increase the probability that the party truly interested in meeting the 
needs of the beneficiaries—the union—has the freedom to administer the 
plans.211 
                                                                                                             
tourniquet necessary to stop the bleeding and regain control of an extremist union head is 
not an accurate representation of the circumstances surrounding passage of the legislation.  
Id.  See also supra note 38 (discussing the United Mine Workers strike and its outcome). 
204 See Fogdall, supra note 36, at 223. 
205 See id. at 224.  Opponents of section 302(c)(5) contend that employers, for the most 
part, see the act of making these contributions as a show of good faith in bargaining with 
employees, but do not have any interest in managing the funds, principally because they 
view the union heads as better protectors of the union members’ investment interests.  Id. 
206 See id. at 227 (discussing the relationship of union members to union heads as unique 
in that the members elect the holders of positions of power in unions, and this power is 
accompanied by a constant reminder of full accountability to the rank-and-file members of 
the union). 
207 See id. As an aside, there may be related contractual issues with the joint 
administration provision in that an employer’s power to bargain away his right to control 
the administration of the fund is taken away.  See id. at 225. 
208 See Note, supra note 37, at 746–47 (discussing the broad assumptions made by section 
302(c)(5)). 
209 See supra note 38 (discussing the United Mine Workers strike and union head John 
Lewis’ actions).  See also Fogdall, supra note 36, at 222–23. 
210 See Fogdall, supra note 36, at 227 (discussing the over-inclusiveness of the joint-
administration provision). 
211 See id. at 227–28. 
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Finally, it has been argued that the joint administration requirement 
has been outdated and superfluous in its effort to ensure the union 
manages the fund for the benefit of its members.212  The Amax Coal 
holding in which ERISA strictly codified the fiduciary obligations of 
trustees of section 302(c)(5) plans makes the strongest case that section 
302(c)(5) has outlived its temporary status as a “stopgap” measure to 
prevent abuse.213  If fund administrators are governed by ERISA’s strict 
fiduciary standards, then the unnecessary section 302(c)(5) restrictions, 
including the joint administration provision, unfairly burden both union 
heads and employers and prevent them from utilizing potentially 
successful solo administration arrangements.214 
3. Removing 302(c)(5) Will Harm the Pension/Disability System 
Congress’s most-cited reason for enacting the safeguards of section 
302(c)(5), the prevention of union abuse of employer contributed funds, 
was not the result of illogical fear of an unsubstantiated outcome.215  The 
fear of a union-dominated economy, in which the extremist views of a 
relatively small group of powerful union heads retained power over the 
economic pulse of the Nation was quite real.216  As such, section 302(c)(5) 
of the LMRA was passed as a preemptive measure designed to prevent 
this domination from extending to employer contributions.217  Modern 
critics argue that section 302(c)(5) has outlived its intended lifespan and 
is no longer necessary to achieve this goal.218  Supporters of the provision 
argue, however, that the longevity of the provision, coupled with its 
extensive safeguards preventing abuse by both unions and contributing 
                                                 
212 Schwab & Thomas, supra note 71, at 1077–78 (discussing ERISA and its governance of 
trustees of section 302(c)(5) plans). 
213 See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.  The Amax Coal holding essentially 
states that the continued existence of section 302(c)(5) creates a double layer of protection 
that is superfluous and potentially stifling to the effective management of welfare funds.  
Id.  See also Note, supra note 37, at 732 (discussing the temporary stopgap status of section 
302(c)(5)). 
214 See Fogdall, supra note 36, at 233. 
215 See supra note 38 (discussing the United Mine Workers strike as the most serious 
example of the very real threats of strong-arm abuse by unions, and Congressional 
understanding of the need to prevent such abuse). 
216 See MILLIS & BROWN, supra note 27, at 312 (discussing the chilling economic impact 
that a labor front characterized by rampant strikes and uncontrolled union activism would 
have on the most important people in the manufacturing process —the end consumer). 
217 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
218 See discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing section 302(c)(5) as an outdated, flawed, 
and overly-preventive measure). 
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employers, make it an invaluable cornerstone in the foundation protecting 
the most important asset of the American labor front—the laborers.219 
The legal system should be cautioned not to overvalue the modern 
applicability of an old statute simply because it has remained in the code 
unaltered.  That said, the argument that sixty years have passed without 
amendment to section 302(c)(5) is of little value absent a showing that 
the law remains relevant to today’s labor market.220  The sweeping 
evolution of labor unions and industry over the past sixty years amid the 
dearth of amendments to 302(c)(5) provides proponents of section 
302(c)(5) with a powerful justification for the argument that the statute 
remains a necessary safeguard against abuse of welfare funds.221 
Perhaps an even stronger justification for the position that a repeal of 
the joint administration provision of section 302(c)(5) would undermine 
congressional intent is the contention that proponents of a repeal do not 
acknowledge one significant aspect of the provision—employer abuse.  
As much as Congress was concerned that union heads would abuse 
employer contributions to welfare funds, so too was Congress 
apprehensive of powerful employers using fund contributions to bribe 
union officials to ignore abhorrent labor practices.222  Though the 
landscape of industry in America has changed momentously over the 
past sixty years, employers still retain significant power over their 
workers.223  In the absence of the 302(c)(5) joint administration 
requirement, no check would exist to prevent employers from 
contributing to union welfare funds contingent on the union accepting 
less-exacting work standards for its members.224  Thus, a repeal of 
section 302(c)(5) may open the floodgates to abuse not just by the unions, 
but also by employers, all to the detriment of the individuals the 
provision was intended to protect.225  
Although the arguments for repeal of section 302(c)(5) and for 
maintaining the section as codified each make a valiant and persuasive 
effort in the face of semi-salient points, neither is effective for solving the 
                                                 
219 See supra discussion Part II.A.2. 
220 Cf. Wallace, supra note 71, at 303 (stating that it has been fifty-eight years since the 
passage of the LMRA, yet section 302 has remained largely unchanged). 
221 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing the longevity of 302(c)(5) amid a 
changing labor landscape).  This argument, though viable, does rely on the somewhat 
shaky reasoning that because there has been no blatant need to repeal or amend 302(c)(5), 
the provision is just as necessary and applicable today as when it was written. 
222 See supra note 37 (discussing the concern for abuse on both sides of the bargaining 
table). 
223 See supra discussion Part II.A.2. 
224 See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s concern for union 
and employer abuse of fund contributions). 
225 See supra notes 38–40 and accompanying text.  See also Note, supra note 37, at 744–46. 
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real problem at issue in this Note:  the plight of once powerful men who 
are now unable to function without constant assistance and care.226  As 
such, a legislative alteration of section 302(c)(5) that allows employees 
who are deferring their own compensation to the fund to opt for greater 
union control of those funds is the most viable solution to the problem.227  
A change in the joint administration provision that allows the employees 
to vest control of the funds in their chosen representatives when a plan is 
structured like the Bell/Rozelle Plan will provide the security from 
extortion that was the source of the original section 302(c)(5), and also 
the prevention of the employer conflict of interest that is central to the 
NFLPA’s concerns.228 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
While Congress and the NFLPA evaluate the merits of potential 
solutions to the claim approval problems, the retirees who are suffering 
plunge deeper into an uncontrollable vortex of mounting medical bills 
and living expenses.  Clearly, the time to act is now.  Unfortunately, the 
solution proposed by the NFLPA—complete redaction of the joint 
administration provision—carries with it too much potential harm to the 
organized labor system as a whole to be a viable option.229  Instead, a 
unique solution that is narrowly focused to meet the NFLPA’s goal of 
gaining the control necessary to approve more claims while maintaining 
the integrity of section 302’s protections is appropriate.  Section IV.A 
presents an amendment to section 302.230  Section IV.B then explains the 
features of the amendment and the positive changes it offers for unions 
situated similarly to the NFLPA.231 
                                                 
226 See supra Parts III.B.1, III.B.2 (discussing the arguments for and against repeal of 
Section 302(c)(5)).  See also supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the plights of many disabled former 
players who have been denied disability benefits sufficient to meet their financial needs). 
227 See discussion infra Part IV (discussing a proposed change to the joint administration 
requirement that would allow employees who are deferring their own compensation (like 
the NFL players) to opt for more union control of the funds). 
228 See discussion infra Part IV (discussing a proposed change to section 302(c)(5) to meet 
the concerns of both Congress and the NFLPA). 
229 See supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the nature of section 302(c)(5) as a necessary check on 
both union and employer abuse of benefit funds to the detriment of employees). 
230 See infra Part IV.A (presenting a proposed amendment to section 302 that will allow 
unions such as the NFLPA to retain greater control over the management of welfare funds 
at the discretion of the union members). 
231  See infra Part IV.B (discussing the two significant components of the proposed 
amendment:  member elections of plan representatives and seat allotment based on the 
source of plan funding). 
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A. Proposed Amendment to Section 302 
This Note proposes an amendment to section 302 that creates an 
exception to the joint administration provision when a 
retirement/disability plan is substantially funded by collectively 
negotiated deferments of compensation by employees.  The amendment 
will allow the union-member employees and retirees, by vote, to 
designate a number of fund administrators proportionate to the 
percentage of plan funds contributed through compensation deferment.  
Such an amendment will allow both retired and active NFL players, 
whose deferment of portions of their salaries fund the Bell/Rozelle Plan, 
to choose by vote the members of the plan administrative board. The 
following amendment to Section 302(c)(5) will result in better 
representation of the beneficiaries’ interests.   
The provisions of this section shall not be applicable 
. . . (5) with respect to money or other thing of value paid 
to a trust fund established by such representative, for the 
sole and exclusive benefit of the employees of such 
employer, and their families and dependents (or of such 
employees, families, and dependents jointly with the 
employees of other employers making similar payments, 
and their families and dependents):  Provided, that (A) 
such payments are held in trust for the purpose of 
paying, either from principal or income or both, for the 
benefit of employees, their families and dependents, for 
medical or hospital care, pensions on retirement or death 
of employees, compensation for injuries or illness 
resulting from occupational activity or insurance to 
provide any of the foregoing, or unemployment benefits 
or life insurance, disability and sickness insurance, or 
accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on which such 
payments are to be made is specified in a written 
agreement with the employer, and employees and 
employers are equally represented in the administration 
of such fund, together with such neutral persons as the 
representatives of the employers and the representatives 
of employees may agree upon and in the event the 
employer and employee groups deadlock on the 
administration of such fund and there are no neutral 
persons empowered to break such deadlock, such 
agreement provides that the two groups shall agree on 
an impartial umpire to decide such dispute, or in event 
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of their failure to agree within a reasonable length of 
time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute shall, 
on petition of either group, be appointed by the district 
court of the United States for the district where the trust 
fund has its principal office, and shall also contain 
provisions for an annual audit of the trust fund, a 
statement of the results of which shall be available for 
inspection by interested persons at the principal office of 
the trust fund and at such other places as may be 
designated in such written agreement; and (C) such 
payments as are intended to be used for the purpose of 
providing pensions or annuities for employees are made 
to a separate trust which provides that the funds held 
therein cannot be used for any purpose other than 
paying such pensions or annuities.  If a trust fund 
established for the sole and exclusive benefit of employees, 
their families, and dependents is funded, in part or in total, by 
payments made from the employer to the fund at the direction 
of the employees, and the source of such payments is direct 
deferment of the employees’ negotiated compensation, the 
employees shall have the right to elect, by majority vote, a 
number of fund administrators proportionate to the percentage 
of total fund contributions traceable to employee compensation 
deferments, provided that the employer shall retain the right to 
appoint a minimum of one administrator to the fund board, 
regardless of the percentage of fund contributions traceable to 
employee compensation deferments. For purposes of this 
exception, the term “employees” shall include active 
employees and retired employees who still qualify as 
beneficiaries of the fund to which the exception is applied.232 
B. Commentary 
The proposed amendment contains two significant components 
designed to allow NFL players and retirees (and employees in other 
industries whose plans are structured similarly) greater flexibility in 
choosing their representatives, and to ensure that the representation is 
fair and for the benefit of the fund beneficiaries.  The first component is 
the creation of a voting system whereby all fund beneficiaries, not only 
active players, are given the opportunity to choose plan administrators.  
                                                 
232 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5).  The normal font represents the language of the statute as 
currently codified.  The text appearing in italics represents the proposed amendments the 
author of this Note adds to the statute. 
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The second component is the allotment of administrator seats to match 
the actual source of plan funding, acknowledging the tendency that, 
despite ERISA’s strict fiduciary obligations, a constituent relationship 
does exist between appointees and the appointing party.233 
First, the creation of a right for employees and retirees who are 
beneficiaries of the plan to vote for plan administrators addresses the 
original Congressional concerns that union bosses will abuse fund 
assets.234  Though the NFLPA has argued that the joint administration 
provision ties its hands with respect to claim approval, the union is not 
without blame for denying retirees the right to vote in elections that 
impact the selection of the NFLPA’s appointees to the Bell/Rozelle Plan 
board.235  Thus, it appears that the NFLPA’s restrictions on voting rights 
have the potential to entice those currently eligible to vote—the active 
players whose salaries are deferred—to vote for administrators who will 
seek to approve lower benefit levels and stretch the salary deferment 
contributions further.  The creation of a vote to elect the plan 
administrators and the extension of this right to retired players will 
create a system in which the interests of the majority of beneficiaries are 
met through the election of administrators who will evaluate disability 
claims fairly, and on the actual merits of the claim.  Furthermore, a 
voting system that includes retirees will create a natural extension of the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 302(c)(5) as including retirees 
under its protections.236  If section 302(c)(5) protects the assets of retirees, 
then allowing retirees to vote on the administrators charged with 
protecting the assets is long overdue. 
Second, the allotment of plan administrator seats to match the 
percentage of employer payments to the fund that are traceable to 
employee compensation deferments addresses several concerns on both 
sides of the issue.  Allowing employees to vote for a number of seats 
equal to the percentage of actual compensation deferments addresses the 
recurring allegations by disabled retirees that the NFL-appointed 
administrators are denying full benefits in an effort to reduce the total 
                                                 
233 See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the Supreme Court’s holding in Amax Coal, 
specifically that ERISA clarified the existence of a solely fiduciary relationship between the 
beneficiaries of a plan and its administrators, and the absence of an agency-type 
relationship to the appointing party). 
234 See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing widespread fears of abuse by union bosses, especially 
the United Mine Workers incident). 
235 See discussion supra Part II.C.3 (discussing the right to elect retired players to be the 
NFLPA representatives on the Bell/Rozelle Plan board as granted solely to active player-
members of the union).  
236 See discussion supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the Allied Chemical holding and its 
extension of section 302(c)(5) protection to retirees who were active employees when a 
covered plan was in effect). 
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payments made by the fund, thus decreasing the league-minimum salary 
likely to be requested by the players when the CBA must be 
renegotiated.237  Despite the NFLPA’s lack of an overt assertion of a 
conflict of interest, the implementation of a seat-allotment system will 
forestall the possibility that this conflict will actually surface.  
Additionally, the proposed seat allotment system will bridge the gap 
between an overbroad equal administration requirement and sole 
reliance on ERISA’s penal scheme for ensuring fiduciary loyalty.238  Next, 
an allotment system based on deferments recognizes the significant 
changes in the retirement system over the generations that have passed 
since the LMRA was enacted.  The past several decades have seen a shift 
from employer-funded retirement to a system funded by compensation 
deferments in both the private non-unionized sector, and to a lesser 
extent, the organized labor industries.  As such, an update to the LMRA 
that provides more flexibility to the employees as the source of the 
funding is both timely and necessary to maintain the integrity of the 
funds and to protect assets that are arguably more valuable based on 
their source.239  Finally, the requirement that an employer retain the right 
to appoint a minimum of one administrator to the plan board, regardless 
of the percentage of funds traceable to compensation deferments, 
accounts for plans that require some level of compensation deferment 
but also provides an employer match to a portion of those deferments.  
Thus, Congress’s original desire to insulate employer contributions from 
union abuse is preserved, even if the employer match is minimal. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The amendment that this Note proposes to section 302(c)(5) would 
likely prevent the unfortunate and unnecessary predicaments of both Bill 
and Wally, the hypothetical characters introduced in Part I.240  Under the 
proposed amendment, the board that reviewed Bill’s disability claim 
would consist of representatives chosen by a vote of Bill and his player 
                                                 
237 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing litigation against the Bell/Rozelle Plan by former 
players alleging abuse of discretion and a conflict of interest in denying claims). 
238 See supra notes 171–74 and accompanying text (discussing the conflict between the 
strict application of the joint administration provision, as required by Amax Coal, and the 
redundancy of the provision following the passage of ERISA’s penalties for breach of 
fiduciary duty). 
239 Because compensation deferments reduce the level of income available for living 
expenses and other savings during a worker’s active employment years, the protection of 
these deferments from abuse and mismanagement may be even more vital than the 
protection of those assets contributed solely out of the coffers of the employer.  
240 See supra Part I (presenting fictional scenarios illustrating the positive and negative 
aspects of section 302(c)(5)’s protections). 
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contemporaries.  The requirements to demonstrate total disability would 
remain the same, but a true fiduciary concern for ensuring the fair and 
proper use of the funds would prevail to ensure that Bill received the full 
benefits to which he was entitled.  The Bell/Rozelle Plan would no 
longer fail disabled retirees in need, like Bill, at the hands of board 
members perpetuating interests contrary to the beneficiaries.  Likewise, 
Wally could retire, secure in the knowledge that the pension checks he 
was promised so many years ago would continue to arrive in his 
mailbox each month.  The proposed amendment to section 302(c)(5) 
would retain the right for Wally’s employer to be represented on the 
plan board, based on the employer’s direct contributions on Wally’s 
behalf.  Thus, the union boss’s fraudulent and abusive investments 
would likely have been stifled at the first sign of trouble, preserving for 
Wally the opportunity to enjoy his well-deserved retirement. 
In the halls of Congress more than sixty years ago, the elected 
representatives of American workers came together to pass legislation 
designed to protect the retirement and disability assets of those workers 
from employer and union corruption.  The amendment this Note 
proposes to the LMRA retains the integrity of Congress’s original intent 
and contemporaneously updates the law to reflect the changing needs of 
American workers.  Congress is in position, and must now pounce on 
the fumble and return possession to those whom it originally intended to 
protect. 
Michael L. Meyer∗ 
                                                 
∗ J.D. Candidate, Valparaiso University School of Law (2009); M.S. Sports 
Administration, Valparaiso University (2006); B.A. Communications Studies and Theatre 
Arts, Marquette University (2002).  Special thanks to my wife Melissa, Mom, Dad, 
Elizabeth, Chris, Karla, and Jennifer for your support and encouragement.  Thanks also to 
Professor Mark Adams for assistance in writing this Note, and to Kristin Gledhill for 
extraordinary editorial guidance.  
Meyer: If Nobody Picks Up the Ball, Is It Really a Fumble, or Is It a Fo
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
